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Ix the first instalment of this article,' we presented an analysis of
the motives which may lead a court to grant legal sanctions against one
who has broken a promise. A distinction was taken between three con-
tract "interests," the protection of which may furnish the basis for
judicial intervention. In the present instalment, we have attempted to
bring together for comparative study a series of situations in which
judicial intervention has been (or in our opinion, should be) limited
to a protection of what we have called the reliance interest.
As was pointed out in the first instalment, the complex of policies
wlch dictates a judicial protection of the expectation interest is strongest
in the case of a promise which forms part of a bargain or "deal". and
which has for its subject matter some economic value dealt with on an
open market, like the contract to sell 5000 pounds of sugar for a named
price. It will be observed that the ensuing discussion is built on a clas-
sificatory scheme which marks, with some asymmetrical elements, a
gradual departure from this typical bargain of commerce. The scheme
of classification embraces, first, cases where, for various reasons, courts
have refused to protect the expectation interest in the case of bargained-
for promises; then takes in promises which are not the subject of
bargains; and ends, finally, with situations which do not even involve
promises, much less bargains. After the discussion of these particular
- situations has been completed, three concluding sections will deal with
certain problems of significance for all of them.
CASES WHERE THE REQUIREmENT OF "CERTAINTY" ExCLuDES
DAmIAGES ATASURED BY THE EXPECTATION INTEREST
The objection that damages measured by the expectancy are too "con-
jectural" to be allowed can obviously have no application to a case
tProfessor of Law, Duke University.
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74. (1936) 46 YALE L. 3. 52.
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where the subject matter of the contract has a market value and the
plaintiff seeks only the difference between the contract price and the
market value. The objection can arise only (1) where the contract re-
lates to a subject matter of uncertain value, that is, having no "market;"
or, (2) where the plaintiff seeks to recover business profits which were
indirectly prevented by the defendant's default, for example, where the
defendant breaks a contract to provide the plaintiff with premises needed
for business purposes, or fails to furnish him with proper seed for the
planting of his farm. In so far as the objection of uncertainty is con-
sidered in cases involving the first situation, it seems to have resulted
in special measures of recovery for certain stereotyped situations, as,
for example, in the case of the contract to adopt,"' and the contract to
sell land.' In these cases, the remission of the plaintiff to the reliance
interest seems to be dictated in part, at least, by a feeling that the value
of the expectancy is too uncertain to be safely measured in money. These
cases may, therefore, represent a real application of the requirement
of certainty, though they are generally not so classified.
The objection of uncertainty is raised in explicit form chiefly in cases
involving the second situation described above, that is, where the plaintiff
asks damages for profits prevented through the disruptive effects of the
defendant's breach on the plaintiff's own business.7 We have already
cited numerous decisions which show that the inability of the plaintiff
to establish his lost profits in cases of this sort does not necessarily pre-
vent him from securing reimbursement for his expenditures.1 8
If we consider only the cases which deny "conjectural!" profits but
grant reimbursement for reliance, and if we accept at face value the
judicial rationalizations offered in those cases, we should have to say
that they involve merely the substitution of a workable for an un-
workable measure of recovery and that the policy exemplified in them
is simply that of administrative convenience. Only a very little reading
between the lines, however, will reveal the fact that administrative
convenience is but one aspect of the problem involved in cases applying
the "standard of certainty." In actual practice, the application of the
requirement of "certainty" varies significantly with factors which have
75. See p. 65, supra, p. 399 infra.
76. See p. 377 infra.
77. "Even today, while the discussions in the opinions often assume that the
standard of certainty of proof applies to the proof of damages generally . . . the
principal field of its use remains the field of loss of commercial profits.' McCoRMxcic,
DAMAGES (1935) 105-106.
78. See the cases cited notes 63-65, supra. These cases suffice to show that the
relief is not limited, as the CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT would limit it, to expenditures
in performance of the contract, or in preparation to perform it (§333), or to the
rental value of the property rendered idle by the defendant's breach (§331).
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nothing to .do with the ease of assessing damages. Thus, Bauer has
shown that in determining whether in a given case lost profits are too
conjectural to be compensated, courts are influenced by the character
of the defendant's breach. Vhere his conduct is "wilful,". the objection
of uncertainty seems not to be taken seriously.7
But other factors, beside the "wilfulness" of the Ibreach, influence
the application of the standard of certainty. Why, for example, is it
applied almost entirely to cases where profits from the plaintiff's own
business are prevented by the defendant's breach and not-at least in
explicit form-to cases where the subject matter of the contract itself
is of uncertain value? Why is it applied very liberally in suits for the
profits lost when a partnership or agency agreement is broken, and very
strictly in those cases where the plaintiff's business is independent of
the defendant's, but happens in some way to be dependent upon per-
formance by the defendant? 0 "McCormick has given the answer. "Like
the 'contemplation of the parties doctrine', the standard of 'certainty'
was developed, and has been used, chiefly as a convenient means for
keeping within the bounds of reasonable expectation the risk which
litigation imposes upon commercial enterprise."'81
What is principally revealed in the actual application of the standard
of certainty is a judicial disinclination to impose on the defendant lia-
bility for those injurious effects of his breach -which do not result
"directly," but are due to the internal structure of the plaintiff's busi-
ness. This disinclination finds a number of distinct doctrinal formula-
tions, of which the requirement of "certainty" is only one, the others
being the test of forseeability (Hadley v. Baxendale), 2 and the theory
that liability rests on a tacit assumption of risk. 3 Where one of these
tests fails to serve its purpose of restricting the scope of liability, another
is usually available as a substitute. Thus, expenditures in reliance can
usually be definitely proved, and the standard of certainty is therefore
an unsatisfactory device for excluding claims founded on the reliance
interest." Yet losses through reliance, equally with lost profits, will
79. Bauer, Moral Fault As Affecting Liability (1933) 81 U. oF PA. L. RLV. 505, 592.
80. The difference in attitude in the tvo Muds of cases is apparent from the
review of the cases to be found in 1 SEDGwxcar, DAaSAGzS (9th ed. 1913) §§ 182-20D;
see especially §§ 193-193a. The comparative liberality of the courts in cases involving
commission sales agencies is also suggested in Comment (1933) 46 Himnv. L_ Ry.
696, 698.
SI. DA7t, GES (1935) 105.
82. See p. 84, supra.
83. Most clearly enunciated in Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil CD, 190
U.S. 540 (1903).
84. It may, of course, be said that it is uncertain to what extent the plaintiff's
expenditures would have been reimbursed through the operations of his business
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
often be felt to be "remote," that is, too dependent upon a peculiar pos-
ture of the plaintiff's affairs. Where this is the case, a way may be
found to deny recovery.85 Again, the failure of the requirement of cer-
tainty to exclude from compensation the profits of a well-established
business does not necessarily prevent a court from finding another way
of denying a liability for the loss of such profits where it is felt that
the liability would be disproportionate to the rewards which the defen-
dant was to receive under the contract.8" On the other hand, where notice
of the plaintiff's peculiar dependence on the contract is present, the test
of Hadley v. Baxendale will not serve, and the test of certainty is the
most usual surrogate.
Concealed in the objection of "uncertainty," then, are a number of
judicial impulses: (1) a desire not to broaden unduly the liability of
the defaulter by making "remote" injuries compensable; (2) a desire
not to impose on the defendant a liability felt to be disproportionate
to the gains which he stood to make from the contract; (3) a desire
to restrict the liability imposed on the "innocent" defaulter in compari-
son with that imposed on the "wilful" defaulter; (4) a desire for an
easily administered rule. Where the last impulse is the controlling one,
the reliance interest is often employed as a surrogate for the xpecta-
tion interest. Where, on the other hand, the first objection ("remote-
ness") predominates, the reliance interest represents a midway station
t
Indeed, the same factors which make it uncertain whether the plaintiff would have
made a net profit also make it uncertain to what extent the gross income of the busi-
ness would have paid its expenses. This objection of uncertainty seems, however, not
to be raised in the cases, and the courts seem to assume in favor of the plaintiff that
he would have "broken even" unless, at least, the defendant is able to prove the con-
trary. See note 42, supra.
85. See the cases cited, notes 56-59, supra. In Rochester Lantern Co. v. Stiles
& Parker Press Co., 135 N. Y. 209, 31 N. E. 1018 (1892) the plaintiff, about to
engage in the business of manufacturing lanterns, contracted with the defendant for
a supply of steel dies. When the defendant failed to supply the dies on time, the
plaintiff claimed reimbursement for expenditures (room rent, rent of business premises,
salaries paid employees) rendered vain by the defendant's default. Recovery was denied
on thd ground that these losses "could not have been contemplated as the natural and
proximate consequence of a breach of the contract." (Id. at 218, 31 N. E. at 1021).
See also Hooks Smelting Co. v. Planter's Compress Co., 72 Ark. 275, 79 S. W. 1052
(1904).
86. As in Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341 (1854) ; cf. Raynor v. Valentin Blatz
Brewing Co., 100 Wis. 414, 76 N. W. 343 (1898). The often repeated distinction be-
tween established businesses and new businesses (the profits of an establisfied business
may be recovered, those of a riew business are too conjectural to be allowed) is be-
lieved to rest in part on a too ready acceptance of the "standard of certainty" at its
face value, and in part on the circumstance that most of the suits for the profits of
an established business involve acts of tortious interference, while those asking for the
profits of a new business are principally breach of contract cases.
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between no liability and a complete liability for the expectancy. As we
have already recalled, losses through reliance are not immune to the
objection of "remoteness;" yet because they make a stronger appeal to
judicial sympathy than a claim for lost profits, the objection of remote-
ness is applied less stridtly to them.87
CASES WHERE DAMAGES MEASURED BY THE EXPECTANCY WOULD
IMPOSE AN UNDUE BURDEN ON THE PROMISOR
The Contract to Convey Land. In about eighteen American states
the courts have followed the English rule, first laid down in Flureau v.
Thornhill,88 which denies a recovery of the expectation interest in a suit
for damages against the vendor who is unable to make out title to the
land he has contracted to convey.80 This rule finds its justification prin-
cipally in two considerations: (1) the difficulty under which the court
or jury would labor in estimating the lost profit, the "market value"
of land being at best an uncertain standard;' (2) the hardship which
the usual rule would impose qn the vendor, in view of the uncertainties
involved in real estate titles and the fact that contracts to sell land are
usually entered without a preliminary study of the title."
Where the vendee is denied the lost profit, his principal claim vAill
usually be for sums paid on the contract. The relief granted by the
courts following the English rule extends, however, beyond mere resti-
tution, since it seems generally agreed that the vendee may also recover
87. "The debtor, however, is not to be subjected to indemnify the creditor for all
the loss which may have been occasioned by the non-performance of the obligation,
and'still less is he answerable for all the gain which the creditor might have acquired,
if the obligation had been satisfied." 1 PoTanm, LAW oF OFr-UIcTIOuS (Evans' trans.
1826) 81 (italics supplied). *
88. 2 W. Black. 1078 (1776).
89. The American cases will be found discussed in McCo McIM, DUms (1935)
680 et seq.; 3 SEDmWICK, DAxAGES (9th. ed. 1913) §9 1001-1022; Note (1930) 68 A. L.t R.
137. Where the vendor acts in "bad faith" a recovery of the lost profit is allowed both
in England and in the American states following the English iule. A recovery of the
expectation interest would probably also be allowed where the conduct of the vendor
is blameworthy even though not in "bad faith" in the usual sense. MfcCo=xcK, DM-
AGES (1935) §179.
90. In the case initiating the rule, Flureau v. Thornhill, 2 NV. Black. 1073 (1776),
the court spoke of the undesirability of awarding damages for "the fancied goodness
of the bargain." Referring to this passage, Lord Chelmsford in the later case of Bain
v. Fothergill, 7 Eng. & Ir. App. 158, 202 (1874) said, "'The fancied goodness of the
bargain' must be a matter of a purely speculative character, and in most cases would
probably be very difficult to determine, in consequence of the conflicting opinions lilely
to be formed upon the subject . . . "
91. Sikes v. Wild, I B.&S. 587, 596 (1861); Engel v. Fitch, 3 Q. B. 314, 331
(1868); Bain v. Fothergill, 7 Eng. & I. App. 158, 173, 194 (1874).
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reimbursement for expenditures made in investigating the title. 2 Whether
recovery may be had for other items subsumable under the reliance in-
terest (as, for example, for the cost of surveying the land, or of erecting
improvements on it) is more doubtful. In some cases there is expressed
a disinclination to extend recovery for expenditures beyond the cost of
a title search, usually rationalized on the ground that such expenditures
are not within the contemplation of the parties, or that it is unreasonable
for the vendee to make expenditures of this sort before the state of title
has been definitely determined."
The Grantor's Warranties of Title. The considerations which argue
for a limitation on the liability of the vendor under a contract to convey
land apply also in favor of the grantor who has warranted the title con-
veyed. A rule permitting a recovery of the lost profit against the war-
ranting grantor contains, in fact, more possibilities of hardship than a
similar rule applied to the man who has merely promised to convey land.
If, on the one hand, the warranting grantor has normally more time than
the vendor to investigate his title before entering an engagement with re-
gard to it, this consideration is more than outweighed by the fact that
his liability on the warranty may first accrue years after it was given,
and after such a change in the value of the land has taklen place as would
make riinous a liability for the advantage lost when the grantee is dis-
possessed. The courts have, accordingly, generally refused to impose on
the warranting grantor an unrestricted liability for the value of the land
lost through failure of title. 4 The relief generally asked for, and granted,
is a return of the price received by the grantor. Whether the relief ex-
tends beyond mere restitution to embrace items classifiable only under
the reliance interest is doubtful. 5
The uncertainties of title and of value which attach to land transac-
tions are less marked in the case of chattels. Nevertheless, some courts
have held, following the analogy of the real property cases, that the lia-
92. McCoaecx, DAMAGES (1935) § 182; 3 SEDOWICK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1913)
§ 1017.
93. Sde Note (1927) 48 A. L. R. 12, 64 et seq.; McComxcc, DA.AGaES (1935) § 183;
3 SEDGWicK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1913) § 1017.
94. McCoRmicx, DA.MAGES (1935) § 185; 3 SEDGWCc, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1913)
§ 951 el seq. In the cases of covenants not "broken when made' four Newv England
States and England and Canada grant the value of the land at the time of eviction.
95. Recovery for improvements is generally denied. 3 SErGwcic, DAMAGES (9th
ed. 1913) §§ 958-959. Expenses reasonably incurred in defending title may be recovered.
3 SEDGwxcK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1913) § 982; McCou.icm, DAMAGES (1935) 707. The
inclusion of these expenses extends the relief beyond mere restitution. On the other
hand, it should be noted that the loss involved in these expenses would have been
avoided either if no contract had been entered or if the contract had been performed.
It is, therefore, a type of loss which may indifferently be subsumed under either the
reliance or the expectation interest. See p. 75, mipra.
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bility of a seller of chattels on his implied warranty of title does not
extend to the expectation interest"0 Perhaps the conflict of the cases on
this point reflects in part a difference in the kinds of chattels involved.' T
CASES WHERE PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT IS INTERFERED
WITHr By EXTERNAL CIRCUMSTANCES
inpossibility and Frustration. A defaulting promisor may be excused
from liability because the performance of the contract has, through some
event unforeseen by the parties, become difficult or impossible ("impos-
sibility"), or because his adherence to the agreement has, in a manner
unanticipated, become pointless ("frustration"). A similar excuse is
sometimes extended in those cases where, unknown to the parties, there
exists from the beginning some circumstance which hampers or renders
futile the performance of the agreement. If we exclude a few fairly
well defined situations, s it is virtually impossible to make useful general-
izations concerning the circumstances under which the excuses of frus-
tration and impossibility will be accepted. The outcome of the cases is
in practice dictated by a shifting line of compromise between the impulse
to uphold the sanctity of business agreements and the desire to avoid
imposing obligations that are vain or unduly burdensome.
In such a field, where no technical rules serve to obstruct an insight
into the purposes underlying contract law, it would seem inevitable that
the cases would reveal a distinction between the three interests which
have been described in this article. Such a distinction has definitely been
taken in America99 (though apparently not in England"'0 ) between the
expectation and restitution interests. Where a contract has become im-
possible of performance, or its object is frustrated, it has been recog-
nized that the most equitable adjustment of the situation may call for
relieving the party from liability for future performance (expectation
interest denied), and at the same time imposing on him a duty to return
benefits received under the contract (restitution interest protected).
96. 2 Wnusox, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 615a; 2 SEDGwICx, DA=GEs (9th ed. 1913)§774; McCozn:cx, DmAGEs (1935) 678.
97. Of the nine cases cited in 2 WILsTr, SALEs (2d ed. 1924) § 615a, n. 84, as
supporting the rule limiting recovery to the price received by the seller plus expenses
incurred in defending title, the first two involved slaves; the next three, horses; the
next two, land certificates. It is obvious that the uncertainty of the value of these
chattels is such as to make the analogy of the real property cases peculiarly apt.
98. RrsntATmz=, CoNT.Acrs (1932) § 458, §459, and illustration 1 to §460.
99. Rnsn&'rmxu , CoxRmAcrs (1932) §463; WXoomvmn, Quisr Cozrucrs (1913)§§ 109-131.
100. WooDw.ARD, QUASr COM ersAC (1913) § 112; 7 HAL SrY 's LAws or Ezror m
(2d. ed. 1932) 214.
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But in this field, where borderline cases are a normal phenomenon, it
would seem that the reliance interest should also play an important role.
Where the court is in doubt whether, the excuse should be permitted at
all, the most satisfactory solution of the difficulty may well be to relieve
the promisor from his duty, at the price, not simply of returning benefits,
but of making good the other party's losses through reliance on the con-
tract. In Germany, the Civil Code expressly recognizes the usefulness
of the reliance interest as a means of acconiplishing the most equitable
allocation of the risks involved in impossibility. 01
There are, apparently,'no American or English cases expressly recog-
nizing a recovery measured by the reliance interest as the means of ac-
complishing a desirable compromise between the extreme demands of
no liability and liability for the full expectation interest. Yet when we
examine the cases cited in the texts as cases of "restitution," we find
much reason to suspect that in some of them the reliance interest has
received protection under an alias. There is exemplified in these cases
the same attenuation of the requirement of "benefit" which will be dis-
cussed at length later in connection with contracts falling within the
Statute of Frauds.'012 When a housemover is permitted to recover for
expenses incurred in moving a house which burned before it reached
101. GEmAN CIVIL CODE, § 307. This recognition of the reliance interest in im-
possibility cases is confined to impossibility existing at the time of the contract. As
to supervening impossibility, the code apparently makes no provision for a possible
claim for the reliance interest. See § 275, § 280, § 325, and the annotations to all the
sections cited in BuscH, DAS BORGERIcH E GESETZBUCH (1929). The explanation for
this rather peculiar distinction between original and supervening impossibility lies, no
doubt, in the fact that the recognition of the reliance interest in the Civil Code was
due to the influence of Ihering's theory of culpa in contrahendo (see note 54, ,I(Pra),
a thebry which dealt only with defects in the formation of contracts and had nothing
to say concerning the effect of subsequent events.
The Roman sources on the basis of which Ihering constructed his theory recognized
a liability for the reliance interest in certain cases of original impossibility. Thus, where
a man sold a thing extra comnercimu, or sold as a slave a man who was actually
free, he was held liable to reimburse the buyer's expenditures in reliance on the con-
tract. (D. 18.1.62; 1. 3.23.5). In at least one passage, furthermore, there is to be
found a recognition of the claim to reimbursement for reliance in a case of supervening
impossibility. If A paid money to B on condition that B make a trip for him, and the
trip became impossible because of the state of the weather or B's health, it was stated
(D. 12.4:5.pr.) that if A sues to recover the money, B may deduct reimbursement for
his expenditures.in preparation for the triji. In the discussion of his theory, Iherling
rejects this passage, not as laying down an improper rule, but as irrelevant to his
theory. Cilpa in contrahendo (1860), printed in 1 GESAuMELrE AUSXT zE (1881) 327,
349, n. 25.
'102. See p. 386, infra. On the degree of seriousness with which the requirement
of "benefie is taken in impossibility cases, see generally, WooDw , QuAsi CoNrRATS
(1913) §§ 115-124; 1omment (1931) 44 HARv. L. Rzv. 623, 625; RESTATEMENT, Cou-
mcrs (1932) §468(3).
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its new location,' or when a lawyer receives reimbursement for services
rendered in preparing a case which never came to trial because the accused
jumped his bail,'" the fact that these cases are analysed in the texts as
directed toward the prevention of "unjust enrichment" cannot remove a
suspicion that their decision was influenced predominantly by the desire
to reimburse a plaintiff who had made expenditures in reliance on the
contracL' ° '
A covert influence of the desire to reimburse detrimental reliance is
not only discernible in the "restitution" cases, where it is assumed that
the party is excused from the contract, but also in the determination of
the issue of excuse itself. When a court is faced with the question
whether the circumstances of the case warrant excusing the defendant
from his contract, there is every reason to suppose that the decision will
be influenced by the type of relief demanded by the plaintiff, and par-
ticularly by the consideration whether the plaintiff seeks to recover an-
ticipated profits, or seeks essentially only to obtain reimbursement (in
the form of the promised price, or otherwise) for expenditures actually
made in performing the contract The cases of Krell v. Henry and
Nicol v. Fitch furnish a useful contrast in this connection. In Krell
v. Henry0 0 the defendant had contracted to pay a large rental for the
use, during a period of two specified days, of certain rooms from which
to view the coronation procession of Edward VII. Because of the king's
illness, the coronation was postponed. The owner of the premises sought
to compel the defendant tb pay the promised price of the rooms; the
court denied recovery. Would the decision have been the same had the
plaintiff generously waived any claim to the promised rent and asked
only reimbursement for expenses incurred in fitting the rooms for the
defendant's special use ?E10 In Nicol v. Fitcli,'0 s the plaintiff agreed for
103. Angus v. Scully, 176 Mass. 357, 57 N. E. 674 (1900).
104. Moore v. Robinson, 92 Il1. 491 (1879).
105. Of course, where the case is conceived by the court as founded on a theory of
restitution, the court may, at an unpredictable point, balk at a further rela.'ction of the
requirement of "benefit." Thus, where the contract is on; for construction and repairs,
and the plaintiff's labor and materials have not yet been incorporated into the defendants
structure, the general tendency is to deny recovery. Mathews Construction Co. v. Brady,
104 N. J. Law 438, 140 At. 433 (1928); (1931) 44 HARv. L. Rr,. 623, 635, n. 12.
106. (1903) 2 K. B. 740.
107. Of course, it did not definitely appear that any such e.penditures had been
made in the actual case of Krell v. Henry. In judging what would have been the judicial
reaction to the case suggested, it should be recalled that while Krell v. Henry is today
generally accepted as "the law" (Note (1936) 52 L. Q. REv. 168), the case was viewed
at the time it was decided as a pioneering one, and the decision that the tenant should
be excused from the contract was regarded as involving a considerable extension of
existing doctrine. Note (1904) 20 L. Q. REv. 3. How a claim by the landlord to reim-
bursement for expenditures should be viewed "on principle," is a matter on which
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a" specified salary to act as agent for the defendant to secure freight for
the defendant's vessel. After the plaintiff had partly performed his
agreement, and after he had, apparently, become so situated that it was
impossible for him to secure work elsewhere during the season, the de-
fendant's vessel sank. The plaintiff was permitted to recover the prom-
ised salary, the court holding that the sinking of the vessel did not
operate to excuse the defendant from his agreement. Would the same
view have been taken if the plaintiff's claim had been entirely for the
"lost profit," as it might have been, had the vessel sunk before the
plaintiff entered upon his duties? 'Is it not reasonable to suppose that
the primary object of the court in Aicol v. Fitch was to reimburse the
plaintiff for his reliance on the contract, even though damages were
measured by the promised price? "'
Impossibility Brought About by the Defendant's Act. Cases involv-
ing impossibility brought about by the act of one of the parties are
reasonable men may differ. Dividing the loss equally would perhaps be the most satis-
factory solution of the problem. If this method of disposing of the case were regarded
as inadmissible, then the reaction of the ordinary sense of justice to the landlord% claim
would probably vary, depending on such factors as the character of the expenditurcs
made and the question who took ihe initiative in the arrangements leading to the contract
and the alteration of the premises. In any event, however doubtful the justice of the
situation may be, there are certainly no "technical obstacles" to granting the landlord
reimbursement for reliance. The assumption made in RSTATmENT, CoN=tACTs (1932)
§468, comment on Subsection (3), and in Comment (1931) 44 HAR. L. Rav. 623, 628,
that where performance of a contract is rendered impossible or frustrated without
either party being "at fault," the contract is dissolved and there remains no basis for
any liability other than that necessary to prevent unjust enrichment, overlooks a quite
different and equally tenable construction of the situation. In the case suggested, though
of course neither party was "to blame" for the king's illness, it can be said that it is
the tenant, and not the landlord, who asks to be excused from the contract. Viewing the
case in this way, there is no reason why the court should not impose as the price of the
tenant's release from the contract that he reimburse the landlord for expenditures made
on the faith of the agreement.
Ther are, of course, situations in which a court would feel no disposition to impose
on one party a liability for the reliance interest of the other. A claim by the ten1a0t1 in
Krell v. Henry to reimbursement for his reliance would present such a case. Probably
no one would doubt the propriety of the decision in the leading case of Eaylor v.
Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826 (1863), which denied a claim to reimbursement for reliance on
a contract later become impossible of performance. (Incidentally, that portion of the
report of Taylor v. Caldwell which reveals the nature of the relief asked by the plaintiff
is apparently not considered of sufficient importance to warrant .its inclusion in the
leading casebooks on contracts, which presumably conceive the problem in the case
to be, not whether the plaintiff was entitled to the particular relief sought, but whether
"the contract" had been dissolved).
108. 115 Mich. 15, 72 N.W. 988 (1897). For a case somewhat similar to Aricoi v.
Fitch, see Retail Merchant's Business Expansion Co. v. Randall, 103 Vt. 268, 153 Ati.
357 (1931).
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usually classified under the rubric "prevention." Actually, they differ
from the impossibility cases only in the fact that they involve a new
factor, that is, a consideration of the "fault" of the parties with respect
to the circumstance which inhibits performance of the contract. The
complexity added by this new factor makes even less defensible than in
"pure" impossibility cases the adoption of an inflexible measure of re-
covery.'00 Of course, where the act of prevention is wholly without
justification, it is quite proper to impose on the preventing party full
liability for the expectation interest. But the justification of the act
of prevention is a matter of degree, and the obvious possibility of bor-
derline cases on the issue of justification suggests the need for a flexible
basis of recovery.
Particularly in one situation, an award of damages measured by the
reliance interest would seem to furnish, in the run of cases, the most
equitable compromise of the interests involved; that is, wsere an em-
ployer, by selling or discontinuing a part or all of his business, renders
impossible further performance of a contract with an employee. To
grant the employee in this situation the full ex\ pectation interest may
seem to restrict unduly the employer's freedom in dealing with the
exigencies of business. On the other hand, to leave the employee with-
out remedy seems unduly harsh where he has incurred expenses (for
example, in moving his residence) in reliance on the reasonable assump-
tion that his employment "would endure for the whole period of the
contract. The appropriateness in this situation of damages measured
by the reliance interest seems to have been overlooked by the courts,
perhaps because it has been overlooked by counsel." 0
A similar approach might also frequently offer the most satisfactory
solution of the cases involving "output ' and "requirement" contracts
where one of the parties sells or discontinues his business during the
term of the contract.'
109. Here, as elsewhere, the attitude taken in the REsTATEmz T (§315) seems
to be whole hog or none.
110. See, however, Griffen v. Sprague Electric Co., 115 Fed. 749 (C. C. S. D. X. Y.
1902), a case in which a kind of joint venture participated in by the plaintiff and de-
fendant was terminated when the defendant sold its business, and where the plaintiff
was permitted to recover reimbursement for expenditures in reliance on the contract.
There is also in Pellet v. Mfanufacturers' & Merchants' Ins. Co., 104 Fed. 502, 509
(C. C. A. 7th, 1900) an intimation that a claim by an employee to reimbursement for
expenditures might be granted where a claim for the lost profit would be denied.
111. The courts seem to have assumed that the termination of the business either
has no effect on the contract at all, or that it dissolves it completely. There is, however,
little reason to doubt that when courts determine, by a process called "interpretation,"
whether the sale or discontinuance of a business constituted a breach of the contract,
they are influenced by the consideration whether the plaintiff had changed his position
in reliance on the contract. There were, for e.mple, very serious acts of reliance
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Insolvency. Where the performance of a contract is interfered with
by the insolvency of the promisor, there arises. not only the necessity
(present in the impossibility and frustration cases) for re-examining,
in the light of the new situation, what is fair between promisor and
promisee, but also for deterinining what is fair between competing
creditors of the promisor. In effecting a just settlement of an insolvent's
affairs, there is no compelling reason why equal treatment should be'
accorded all claims which happen to be classified as "founded on a
contract." There is, for example, an obvious difference in the immediacy
of the appeal made to judicial sympathy, between the position of the
creditor who asks. the price of goods sold and delivered, and that of the
creditor who demands compensation for the profit lost when the in-
solvent refused to take the proffered goods.
In bankruptcy cases, the chief obstacle to a discrimination between
kinds of contract claims lies in the wording of the statute itself. The
statute puts claims founded "upon a contract express or implied" in
one class, and contemplates only one distinction between such claims-
that giving a restricted priority to claims for wages.1 12 Yet in border-
line cases concerning such questions as the provability and release of
claims there is obviously an opportunity to favor those types of contract
claims which are regarded as possessing superior "equities." Thus, the
one time reluctance of courts to treat bankruptcy as an anticipatory
breach of executory contracts (and thus make "provable" the creditor's
right to the lost profit) may very well have arisen from a realization
that such a claim would normally come into conflict with the claims of
other creditors who sought the price of performances already rendered.1 '
The persistence of this attitude in cases involving a landlord's claim to
unaccrued rent may result from the same causes, and from the fact
that where a long-term lease is involved the landlord's claim to the lost
profit: may virtually absorb the whole estate to the exclusion of those
who were supplying the day-to-day needs of the lessee.114
shown in Diamond Alkali Co. v. P. C. Tomson & Co., 35 F. (2d) 117 (C. C. A. 3d,
1929), where the court held that the defendant's discontinuance of its business con-
stituted a breach of an implied term of a contract, which, so far as its express terms
were concerned, merely imposed a duty on the defendant to supply its needs, during a
period of five years, by purchases from the plaintiff.
112. BA';r.RuPrcy Acr, §§ 63-64, 30 STAT. 562 (1898), 11 U. S. C. §§ 103-104 (1934).
113. The case of Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 240 U. S. 581
(1916), finally settled the question in favor of the provability of the claim to lost profits
on a contract executory at the time of the filing of the petition. For the history of the
judicial treatment of this question prior to the Central Trust case, see Comment (1914)
27 HARv. L. REv. 469; 2 COLLIER, BANICMUPTCY (13th ed. 1923) 1409.
114. The question of the landlord's claim to "unaccrued rent" (wvhich means, since
a deduction must be made of the present rental value of the premises, his claim to the
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A distinction between contract claims may be achieved within the
framework of the Bankruptcy Act not only, as has just been pointed
out, by excluding the less favored claim as "unprovable," but also by
converting the favored claim into a "property" interest. Britton has
suggested that the device' of the "equitable lien" is sometimes manipu-
lated to secure a position of priority for the creditor who seeks the price
of a benefit conferred."
The judicial process is less hampered by legislative restrictions in
receiverships than it is in bankruptcy, and we discover in that field, ac-
cordingly, a more effective tendency to stratify contract claims. Not
only do we find the same covertly effected preference for the restitution
interest discernible in bankruptcy cases, but also, in at least two de-
cisions,.a distinct recognition of the reliance interest and of its priority
over the claim to the lost profit. In Coy v. Title Guarantee & Trust
Co., " the receiver of an insolvent corporation, who had disaffirmed a
contract to grant an e-xtension of a lease to the plaintiff, was excused
from compensating the plaintiff for the lost profit, but compelled to
reimburse him for expenditures actually made in reliance on the con-
tract. The case involves an especially clear recognition of the reliance
interest because the plaintiff's expenditures were of no benefit to the
corporation, but were actually detrimental in their effect on the value
of the leased premises. In Griffith v. Blackwater Boom, & Lumber Co., T
lost profit on the lease) was finally settled against provability in Manhattan Properties,
Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 291 U. S. 320 (1934). Since that decision Congress has at-
tempted a compromise of the interests involved by providing that the landlord has a
provable claim to damages but not to exceed "the rent reserved by the lease, without
acceleration, for the year next succeeding the date of the surrender of the premises plus
an amount equal to the unpaid rent accrued up to said date." BA:muPrcy AcT, § 63 (a)
as amended in 48 STAT. 923, 924 (1934), 11 U.S. C. (Supp. 1935) § 103.
115. Britton, Equitable Liens-A Tentative Analysis of the Problem (1930) 8
N. C. L. REV. 388.
116. 193 Fed. 275 (D. Ore. 1912). In this case the court limited recovery to the
reliance interest, and implied that the plaintiff was without remedy for the lost profit.
In Wells v. Hartford Manilla Co., 76 Conn. 27, 40, 55 AUt. 599, 604 (1903), however,
the court said, "If . . . the condition of an estate was such that the allowance of a
claim of this character [i.e., for the lost profit] would not encroach upon the assets
necessary to satisfy other creditors, and there was to remain in the hands of the re-
ceiver a balance after the expenses of settlement and claims were paid, quite a different
situation would prcsent itself, to which other considerations would apply." (It should
be noted that in so far as Wells v. Hartford Manilla Co. denies a claim to the lost
profit it has been overruled by Napier v. People's Stores Co., 98 Conn. 414, 120 At.
295 (1923).)
117. 55 V. Va. 604, 48 S. E. 442 (1904). See also State v. Associated Pacldng Co.,
195 Iowa 1318, 192 N. W. 267 (1923). The recognition of the reliance interest is less
clear in these cases than in the Coy case. In the Blackwater Boom case and in the
Associated Packing Company case, the services rendered were of benefit to the corpora-
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the court also granted "compensation for outlay and expenses," and as-
sumed that the receiver was under no liability to make compensation
for anticipated profits.
There are, of course, a considerable number of cases contrary to the
two cases just cited, and the general tendency seems to be toward treat-
ing the claim to the lost profit on a parity with other contract claims
in the administration of receiverships."" But it should be noticed that
many of the cases in which this tendency is exemplified involve claims
founded on contracts for the sale of commodities which, like sugarllD
and oil,'2 are dealt with on more or less open markets. On the other
hand, the strongest resistance toward the tendency to place the claim
to anticipated profits on a parity with other contract, claims is to be
found in cases involving leases 12' and contracts of employment 22 -
transactions which, it is significant to note, are less intimately parts of
the credit.system than are contracts to sell goods. 23 The conception of
the parties as participants in a common adventure-utterly foreign, for
example, to the contract to sell 50 barrels of sugar-colors these trans-
actions and militates against the view that the right of the one party
to the other's future performance is an immediate economic good de-
serving the full protection given any other "property" interest.
CONTRACTS IMPERFECT IN ExPREssio- OR iN LEGAL EFFECT
Contracts Within the Statute of Frauds. The effect of the Statute
of Frauds, as it is construed by the courts, is not to obliterate the oral
contract, but merely to lessen its legal consequences. 124 One consequence
which the oral contract unquestionably has is that benefits conferred un-
der it may be recovered from the recipient if he fails to perform his
side of the agreement; in other words, the statute does not preclude a
tion, and there is a possibility of construing them as cases of restitution. In the Black-
water Boom case, however, the recovery seems to have been measured by the ex-
penditures of the plaintiff, rather than by the value of his services.
118. See Comment (1931) 31 COL. L. Rv. 297; Note (1924) 33 A. L. R. 508.
119. As in Napier v. People's Stores Co., 98 Conn. 414, 120 Atl. 295 (1923).
120. As in Texas Co. v. International & G. N. Ry., 250 Fed. 742 (C. C. A. 5th,
1918) (fuel oil); Samuels v. E. F. Drew & Co., 292 Fed. 734 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923)
(cocoanut oil).
121. Comment (1934) 34 Cor. L. REv. 143.
122. Comment (1931) 31 CoL. L. Rrv. 297, 300.
123. Cf. the characteristics of the ideal contract from the standpoint of the credit
system (outlined p. 65, supra); and the discussion of the influence of open markets on
the conception of the expectancy as a present value, pp. 62-63, 74, supra.
124. This is generally true even though the particular statute purports to make the
contract "void!' 3 WILiSTON, CONTRACTS (2nd ed. 1936) § 531.
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judicial protection of the restitution interest."- At the other extreme,
it is equally clear that the statute does bar--subject to judicial ingenuity
in circumventing the bar-any action founded on the expectation inter-
est. The really doubtful question relates to the reliance interest. The
man who has made actual disbursements of money, property, or labor
in reliance on an oral agreement which is later broken by his co-contractor
makes a strong appeal to judicial sympathy. There are, however, at
least two possible obstacles to granting him relief where his disburse-
ments have not operated to enrich the other party.
The first of these lies in finding a name for the action. To call it
-'cbntractual" would seem to throw it directly within the prohibition of
the statute. It is, on the other hand, difficult to regard the defaulting
party's conduct as a tort-simply because it does not look like a tort.
Quasi-contractual recovery is excluded because of the absence of "un-
just enrichment." There exists, therefore, no ready pigeonhole for the
action, and this will create, for many minds, a doubt whether the action
should be permitted at all-for the writ system finds its modem equiv-
alent in a conception of legal method which demands that every action
shall have a recognizable "nature."
Worthy of more serious consideration is a second objection to per-
mitting a recovery of the reliance interest, which lies in the argument
that to grant reimbursement for reliance on the oral contract would be
to violate the statute. -So far as the language of the statute is con-
cerned, there is no more violation of its terms involved in granting
reimbursement for reliance than there is in effecting a restitution of
benefits conferred. The argument that restitution is not a suit "on the
contract," but is founded on a rescission of the contract, can have little
weight in interpreting a statute passed long before this "theory" of
restitution had established itself." ° On the other hand, if all that is
125. 3 Wrmusroxr, Coxmcrs (2nd ed. 1936) § 534; RP.TATm t,-T, Co:rirnrcrs
(1932) §355; WOODWARD, QUASI COiNRACTS (1913) §§93-103. "Vlule the defendant
is not regarded as altogether a wrongdoer in refusing to perform his oral contract, if
he fails to perform it he is [presumably, a little bit of a wrongdoer, and is, therefore]
under an enforceable duty to make restitution of value received." Comment b to § 355
of the RESTATEME r (italics supplied). Restitution is permitted in spite of the fact
that (1) the remedy requires proof of the oral agreement for the purpose of showing
that the benefits conferred were not intended as a gift, and (2) may require a reference
to its terms in order to show that the recipient has ;not rendered the promised ex-
change value. R5TATEmENT, CoNTaAcrs (1932) §355(4); cf. Koch -,. Williams, 82
Wis. 186, 52 N. V. 257 (I892). Where doubt arises whether the defendant is in
default, it may well result that all of the terms of the oral contract will come in issue.
126. "No general recognition of a right to restitution as a remedy for breach of
contract existed prior to decisions of Lord Mansfield and Lord Kenyon at the end of
the eighteenth century." 3 IVMI.usroN, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1455, n. 1. In what
appears to be the earliest case measuring damages by the defendant's benefit. Anony-
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
needed is a way of conceiving of the suit which will avoid the appear-
ance that it is brought "on the contract," the suit to obtain reimburse-
ment for reliance may also be viewed as based on a rescission of the
contract-at least the Supreme Court of :Errors in Connecticut found
no difficulty, and apparently experienced no juristic pain, in conceiving
of the suit in this way.'27
Even though the language of the statute offers no more serious ob-
stacle to reimbursing reliance than it does to granting restitution, it is
of course possible that the two forms of relief stand in different rela-
tions to the policy of the statute. In determining whether the granting
of a particular form of recovery would violate the "policy of the statute,"
the courts seem to-be influenced, not only by the hardship produced if
the action is denied, 'but by two other factors more directly pertinent to
the apparent purposes of the statute: (1) To what extent will the action
entail a reference to the terms of the oral agreement? (2) To what
extent will the circumstances of the case afford evidentiary guaranties
which may be regarded as a substitute for the required writing?
So far as the first question is concerned, it may be said that neither
the suit for restitution nor the suit to obtain reimbursement for reliance
is free from the possibility that it may involve a detailed reference to
the terms of the oral agreement. This would, for example, be necessary
where a dispute arose whether the defendant was in default-an issue
which may be raised in either form of suit. On the other hand, one
type of reference to the oral agreement might become necessary in a
suit founded on the reliance'interest which would not be involved in
restitution cases, that is, in order to limit the plaintiff's maximum re-
covery to that measured by the expectation interest. 28 But since we have
mous, 1 Str. 407 (1721), nothing is said about a "rescission" of the contract. (Cf.,
however, Mansfield's discussion in Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 1011 (1760).)
127. See Rabinowita v. Marcus, 100 Conn. 86, 123 Atl. 21 (1923), discussed in
note 32, supra at 73.
128. It is not clear that the expectation interest would be regarded as limiting-the
plaintiff's claim to reimbursement for reliance. As was pointed out previously (pp.
75-80, supra), any limitation of recovery by the expectation interest may be viewed
as an indirect enforcement of the contract for the benefit of the defaulter, and, in the
case of an oral contract, it may be an enforcement which the court would regard as
excluded by the statute. That a refusal to impose this limitation would have the con-
sequence that the plaintiff would be more advantageously situated with an oral contract
than with a written one, does not bring about a situation utterly without parallel. (Cf.
King v. Welcome, 5 Gray 41 (Mass. 1857). On the other hand, if the plaintiff should
claim a large sum, greatly in excess of "the contract price" for what we have calld
(p. 78, .pra) "incidental reliance;' it is probable that a court would balk at imposing a
burden on the defendant greater than the performance of the contract itself would have
involved. (See the discussion of cases where "the contract price" may properly limit
recovery for "incidental reliance;' p. 80, supra). There are, however, ready at hand
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here only an additional possible use of the oral contract, over those uses
which may be necessary in restitution, the difference involved is one of
degree only, and by no means compels a distinction between the two
kinds of relief.
So far as evidentiary guaranties are concerned, the suit to obtain
restitution may seem to be distinguished from the suit asking reimburse-
ment for reliance on the ground that in restitution cases the defendant's
act of receiving the benefit constitutes corroborative evidence (emanat-
ing from "the party to be charged") of the existence of the contract.
This argument is sound only in the sense that it may help to explain
the usual or normal case; the remedy of restitution is, however, not
confined to cases where the "receipt" of the benefit involves conduct on
the part of the defendant. "
There is, then, no distinction which requires a court to deny reim-
bursement for reliance, and, at the same time, permits it to grant resti-
tution on a contract made unenforceable by the statute. A court which
broadened its intervention to include a protection of the reliance interest
might justify its stand on the ground thai the admitted differences be-
tween the restitution and reliance interests are insufficient to warrant
a difference in legal treatment, and might properly view the reimburse-
ment of reliance, not as involving legal sanction for the unenforceable
agreement, but as having the same raison d'91re as restitution-that of
remedying injustices left when the statute denies enforcement to the
oral contract.
So far as the cases are concerned, there are at least two decisions grant-
ing reimbursement for the plaintiff's reliance on an oral contract, under
circumstances such that it would involve considerable temerity to con-
strue the relief' granted as "restitution." In McCrowdll v. Burson,'"
the plaintiff recovered for expenditures in preparing to perform an oral
contract to build a house for the defendant when the defendant later
refused to permit the plaintiff to undertake the actual work of con-
struction. The recovery was rested on a contract "implied in law." In
other means of limiting recovery (the notions of causality and foreseeability, for esample)
which might render unnecessary a resort to any limitation giving the appearance of
being too directly derived from the terms of the oral contract. The problem here
discussed must be distinguished from the question whether the plaintiff's right to
restitution is limited by the ex-pectation interest. See 2 WxrLxsroa, Co:,rmcrs (2d.
ed. 1936) §536.
129. "A renders services as a missionary in Africa in return for B's promise to
educate A's children. B commits a total breach. A can get judgment [in a suit for
restitution] for the reasonable value of his services . . ." RrrAT rr, CoznAcrs,
(1932) § 343, illustration 2.
130. 79 Va. 290 (1884).
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Huey v'. Firank, 3' after entering an oral contract for the lease of the
plaintiff's premises, the defendant requested certain expenditures by the
plaintiff (for "lettering," telephone connections, and window shades)
to fit the premises for his occupancy. When the defendant refused to
accept the premises under the oral contract, the plaintiff was permitted
to recover reimbursement for these expefiditures. It will be noted that
both cases were decided before the profession had been penetrated by
the modem learning of quasi contracts, with its emphasis on "unjust
enrichment"
It must be admitted that the decisions just discussed stand opposed
by a number of cases -which have refused reimbursement for reliance
on a contract made unenforceable by the statute. 32 It would be a mis-
take, however, to judge the extent of the legal protection accorded the
reliance interest exclusively by a reference to the cases in which the
problem is made explicit. Here, as elsewhere, the reliance interest seems.
to prefer to travel incognito. It is probable that eases openly reimburs-
ing detrimental reliance are rare simply because it is so easy to reach
substantially the same result by other methods-methods which seem to
involve less violence to traditional conceptions.
The first of these methods lies in the notion that "part performance"
or reliance may "take the contract out of the Statute of Frauds." What
this notion means in its broadest form is simply that when an oral con-
tract has been seriously relied on, it becomes enforceable. 3 The notion
that reliance or "part performance" may take the place of a writing
finds application in the doctrine of equity that the vendee's going into
possession and making payments or erecting improvements will take a
131. 182 Ill. App. 431 (1913). In addition to McCrotuell v. Burson and H.tcy V.
Frank, two rather numerous classes of cases might haveJbeen cited here as involving
a recognition that the reliance interest on the oral contract is entitled to judicial pro-
tection: (1) cases which may somewhat dubiously be classed as "restitution" cases,-
see notes 145-147, infra; (2) cas§s where a plaintiff who has relied on a contract for
the sale of land is permitted to recover reimbursement for his change of position,--see
note 141, infra. *The first group of cases are here excluded because of the uncertainty
of their classification; the second, because they represent a limitation on, rather than
an extension of, judicial intervention in the case of oral contracts, since in most juris-
dictions the plaintiff becomes entitled to specific performance where he has (in certain
defined ways) relied on the oral contract.
132. Butler v. Shehan, 61 Ill. App. 561 (1895); Boone v. Coe, 153 Ky. 233, 154
S. W. 900 (1913) ; Dowling v. McKenney, 124 Mass. 478 (1878) ; Banker v. Henderson,
58 N. J. Law 26, 32 AUt. 700 (Sup. Ct. 1895) ; Cocheco Aqueduct Association v. Boston
& Maine R k., 59 N. 11 312 (1879).
133. It is recognized that when courts speak of "part performance' they do not
necessarily use the term in a restrictive sense, and that they often actually treat as
"part performance" acts of reliance which are not "performance" at all. See, for
example, on the equity doctrine of part performance applied to land contracts, RESTATE-
mT, CoNracrs (1932) § 197, comment b.
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contract to sell land out of the statute;" 4 in the rule that a comeyance
of land makes the vendee liable for the orally promised price;r35 in the
view that an oral contract not to be performed within a year becomes
enforceable so soon as one side is performed -1 0 in the cases holding
that an oral agreement fixing a disputed boundary becomes enforceable
so soon as it has been acted upon;' 37 in the rule that where an oral con-
tract has altered a written contract within the statute, certain uses of
the original written contract are excluded so soon as the oral agreement
has been relied on-' 38 and-so far as the decisions, at least, are con-
cerned-in many other situations.30 By classifying, and thus isolating,
its individual applications, the textbooks make a strenuous effort to keep
the notion that reliance may take the place of a writing from achieving
an indefinite field of application-with what indifferent success even a
cursory inspection of the digests will reveal.'10
Where the various doctrines of "part performance" are applied, the
recovery is normally of the expectation interest? "t It is quite under-
134. REsTATEmENT, CoNRAcs (1932) § 197.
135. Id. § 193 (3). This result is reached though the conveyance is made, at the
request of the defendant, to a third person. Birch v. Baker, 85 N. J. L. 660, 90 AtL
297 (1914).
136. RE.sTAT=NT, Co, RnAcrs (1932) § 198.
137. Id. at § 196.
138. Id. at §224.
139. See, for example, the numerous cases extending. "the equity doctrine of part
performance" to acts in reliance on the oral contract which do not take the form of a
taking of possession and making payment or erecting improvements. Cases of this
sort will be found collected in Aixmxc=az Lw IxsTrrur , Coz t tnsurrEs Oar Cozrncrs
REsTATEMNT No. 4 (1928) 13-30; (1933) 13 B. U. L. REv. 312; (1931) 16 IowA
L J. 448.
See, also, cases holding that a contract to adopt is removed from the effect of the
statute when the foster child is taken into the home. 2 C. J. S., title, "Adoption of
Children' §26(b).
See, further, cases holding that "part performance" of a contract to sell land takes
the contract out of the statute "in law" as well as "in equity,' thus making possible
a recovery of damages. The cases are collepcted in (1932) 16 Mirs. L. REv. 446. § 197
of the RESTATEMENT OF CoNTiRAcrs limits the effect of the doctrine of "part performance"
to equitable relief.
140. It is true that in these "part performance" cases the motive of protecting the
party who has relied is sometimes mixed with, or even superseded by, other considera-
tions. Obviously, in many of the cases there is the additional motive of preventing
unjust gain. In some cases, furthermore, "part performance" is considered as serving
an evidentiary function, thus offering a substitute for the required writing. Pound, The
Progress of the Law, 1918-z99, Equity (1920) 33 HARv. L. Rnv. 929, 933 ct s eq. It is
enough for our purposes, however, to note that in many of the cases the predominant
motive is avowedly to protect the party who has changed his position, and that, in any
event, the various doctrines of "part performance" are phrased broadly enough to furnish
a substantial vent for the judicial impulse to compensate detrimental reliance.
141. In several of the southern states, however, the courts have limited their inter-
vention in the case of "partly performed" land contracts to reimbursing the plaintiff
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standable why this should be so. In the first place, the, apologetics of
judicial intervention here employed demands this result. If part per-
formance does indeed "take the contract out of the statute," then there
is no reason to deny the remedies which would be available if the con-
tract were in writing. So far as the "equity doctrine" of part perform-
ance of land contracts is concerned, the fact that specific performance
avoids all difficulties of estimation, and is, in any event, the normal
remedy in equity, serves also to explain the readiness with which this
relief is granted.
Closely allied to the various "doctrines of part performance," though
enjoying less prestige with the textwriters, is the notion that reliance
by one party on an oral contract may "estop" the other from "setting
up" the statute.14 - Here, even more clearly than in cases of "part per-
formance," the fundamental motive is the protection of the reliance
interest, though the recovery apparently is here also measured by the
expectation interest-if for no other reason, because this result is again
the one most consistent with the apologetics of judicial intervention.
The most interesting method which has been developed for protecting
the reliance interest in the case of contracts made unenforceable by the
statute lies, however, in an expansion of the notion of restitution. 3
We called attention earlier to the shifting line of division between the
restitution and reliance interests.14 4 The notion. of restitution occurs
in" its "purest" form in the case of a tangible benefit conferred directly
by the plaintiff on the defendant-as where A pays $1000 to B for
a conveyance of land, and, failing to get the land, is allowed to recover
his $1000. Here two motives for judicial intervention are inextricably
for his reliance. See Pound, The Progress of the Law, 19z8-1919, Equity (1920) 33
HAxv. L. Rv. 929, 936; Wilhoit, The Statute of Frauds and Part Perfornance of
Land Contracts i Kentucky (1934) 22 Ky. L. J. 434; (1922) 1 N. C. L. R v. 48.
In Reynolds v. Reynolds, 74 Vt. 463, 52 Atl. 1036 (1902), the court held that a
plaintiff who had, through "part performance" of a land contract, become entitled to
specific performance might, if he chose, sue at law for the reasonable value of work done
in performing the contract.
142. Summers, The Doctrine of Estoppel Applied to the Statute of Frauds (1931)
79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 440; (1931) 44 HA2v. L. REv. 1147; (1931) 29 Micr. L. REv. 1075;
(1932) 16 MINN. L. Ra,. 446.
143. It is true that an expansion of the concept "unjust enrichment," similar to that
about to be described, has also enlarged the remedy of restitution where the contract is
in writing. Since, however, in the case of written contracts the reliance interest receives
abundant judicial recognition on its own account, the exact location of the line which
separates the reimbursement of *reliance from the restitution of benefits is here, at the
most, a matter of definitional convenienae. On the other hand, where the reliance interest
has to be smuggled in under the cloak of restitution, the definition given unjust en-
richment is a matter of real importance, since it actually marks the limits of judicial
intervention.
144. See p. 71, supra:
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mixed: making the plaintiff whole, and making the defendant disgorge.
These two motives are, in varying degrees, present wherever the de-
fendant through the breach of an agreement secures a gain for himself.
But the notion of gain is capable of indefinite expansion, and by a pro-
cess of diluting the concept "benefit" or "enrichment," it becomes pos-
sible to extend restitution over a very broad field. Though the remedy
of restitution, however expanded, may thus be made to appear to remain
the same-simply because its formal definition does not change-there
is no reason to suppose that the controlling incentives to judicial inter-
vention remain constant throughout tids process of expansion. As the
"benefit" received by the defendant becomes more ethereal, the r8le in
the total judicial motivation which is properly assignable to a desire to
prevent the defendant from keeping an unjust gain becomes increasingly
less, until the point is finally reached where it must be assumed to dis-
appear altogether. An attenuation of the concept "benefit" means, there-
fore, at least an increasing emphasis on the reliance interest (making
the plaintiff whole), and it may mean that the protection of that interest
has become the exclusive raison d'tre of judicial intervention.
In cases of the type under consideration, an ex\'pansion of the scope
of restitution has been accomplished principally in two ways; in the
first place, by substituting for "benefit" the notion of "bargained-for
act." 145 In some cases, this seems a very reasonable refinement, not at
all inconsistent with the original purpose (or rather, purposes) of resti-
tution. For example, if A contracts to have built on his land a house
of fantastic design which actually decreases the market value of the lot,
it seems fair to say that he has received a benefit, though his assets, as
viewed by a banker, have actually diminished. But when we find that
through this concept of the bargained-for act it becomes possible for
the plaintiff to secure restitution because he remained idle, 40 "or spent
money in improving his own property,147 we begin to doubt whether in
cases of this sort the dsire to take a windfall away from the defendant
can really be a significant part of the motive for judicial intervention.
145. REsTATEamENT, CoxNTcTs (1932) § 347 (" . . . performance . . . for
which the defendant bargained").
146. Randolph v. Castle, 190 Ky. 776, 223 S. NV. 413 (1921), (1921) 5 Mnnr. I.
REv. 567. Actually, the court in this case did not proceed upon a theory of restitution,
but went on the simple ground that the plaintiff' loss through unemployment should
be "borne by the defendant, the one who caused it." For this reason, the case might very
well have been cited along with .lfcCrowell v. Burson and Hucy v. Frant, at 3S9-390,
supra, as a decision openly protecting the reliance interest. Since, however, it appeared
by the terms of the oral agreement that the plaintiff's idleness could be regarded as a
"bargained-for act:' we have listed it conservatively with cases of restitution. As this
case illustrates, the courts by no means make the sharp distinction between kinds of
relief which is to be found in the textbooks and in the Restatement.
147. Bank v. Magruder, 77 Fla. 235, 81 So. 440 (1919).
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The second extension of the notion of restitution, which is in some
aspects a corollary of the first, is that where the plaintiff has performed
a bargained-for act, his recovery is measured not by the defendant's
enrichment, but by his own detriment.""8 If the purpose of restitution
is indeed, as it is defined in the Restatement, to compel the defendant
"to return to the plaintiff the value of any performance that he has
received," ' 4 it seems odd that this value should be measured at the point
of departure instead of at the point of arrival.
This expansion in the scope of restitution has not escaped previous
observation.""5 . The comments elicited have been to the effect that the
cases carry the remedy of restitution beyond the field of the "true quasi-
contractual obligation,"'' and into the field of "indemnification sound-
ing in tort."'5 2 The question of the "true nature" of the obligation is,
happily, not relevant to our purposes. Our concern is with a more mun-
dane problem: When the benefit received by the defendant has become as
attenuated as it is in some of the cases cited, and when this benefit is
"measured" by the plaintiff's detriment, can it be supposed that a desire
to make the defendant disgorge is really a significant part of judicial
motivation? When it becomes impossible to believe this, then the courts
are actually protecting the reliance interest, in whatever form their inter-
vention may be clothed.
Indefinite Contracts. Where the terms of a contract are too indefinite
to make it possible to grant the plaintiff the expectancy or its value, will
148. As Williston states it, the rule generally .prevailing is that "the plaintiff's
measure of restitution is based . . . on the reasonable value of what he has done,"
the "reasonable value' being in turn measured, not by the defendant's benefit, but by
"the plaintiff's detriment from the performance which he has rendered." 2 WiLusToN,
Co T ACTS (2nd ed. 1936) § 536. It should be noted that this method of measurement
has been applied occasionally in cases where the acts done by the plaintiff were not
bargained for, or even requested, by the defendant. Thus, it has been held that one in
possession of land under an oral contract to purchase may rtcover against the defaulting
vendor reimbursement for expenditures made on his own initiative, without reference
to the enhancement in the value of the land which they effect. Dreler v. Sher vood, 77
Colo. 539, 238 Pac. 38 (1925) ; Clark v. Davidson, 53 Wis. 317, 10 N. W. 384 (1881);
Miller v. Metz, 103 Wis. 220, 79 N. W. 213 (1899). But see Bendix v. Ross, 205 Wis.
581, 585, 238 N. W. 381, 382 (1931), (1932) 8 Wis. L. Rnv. 87.
149. § 355, comment b; cf. § 347, comment b, and see p. 89, supra.
150. A2xacAN LAW INsTrrUTF, RESTATEx4ENT oF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST Er1-
aIcHmET, TENTAT V D rAF No. 1 (1935) 272, speaks of "cases i3here a contract was
unenforceable because of the Statute of Frauds and restitution was allowed to the person
performing, some of which [cases] cannot be supported on the ground of unjust en-
richment." See also Costigan, Implied in Fact Contracts and Mutual Assew (1920)
33 HA~v. L. REv. 376, 392; (1928) 26 Mica. L. :Rxv. 942; Comment (1931) 44 HARV.
L. Rnv. 623; (1932) 8 Wis. L. Rnv. 87.
151. (1932) 8 Wis. L. REv. 87, 90.
152. Comment (1931) 44 HA.v. L. Rav. 623, 627.
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a recovery measured by the reliance interest be permitted? The paucity
of cases renders an answer in general terms difficult. There are to be
discerned in this field, however, tendencies toward a protection of the
reliance interest analogous to those discussed in connection with con-
tracts within the Statute of Frauds. A close parallel to the various
doctrines of "part performance" under the Statute of Frauds is to be
found in cases in which it is held that reliance on a contract may remove
the objection of indefiniteness.'*' Though this view of the effect of
reliance is usually rested on the theory that reliance traces the contour
of the contract (cf. the evidentiary function of "part performance"
under the Statute of Frauds), it has also been placed on the simple
ground that the need to reimburse detrimental reliance justifies a court
in running a hazard of uncertainty which would otherwise be avoidedY'
There is also observable in the cases dealing with indefinite contracts
the same extension of the notion of restitution found in the Statute
of Frauds cases ;5 and at least one case granting reimbursement for
expenditures made in reliance on a contract of indefinite terms has
squarely repudiated the notion that the recovery must be rested on a
"benefit' received. This is thp, Kearns v. Andree14' in which
the vendor under a defecivel§(drafte contract to sell a house and lot
was permitted to recover against the defaulting vendee the cost of alter-
153. 1 W ,r.sTox, CONTRACrS (2nd ed. 1936) § 49.
154. Morris v. Ballard, 16 F. (2d) 175 (App. D. C. 1926). In the case cited the
reliance involved (the making of improvements by a lessee on the faith of an option to
purchase) had no tendency to remove the uncertainty of the contract (which related to
the terms of payment under the option).
155. Wyman v. Passmore, 146 Iowa 486, 125 N. V. 213 (1910); Von Reitzenstein
v. Tomlinson, 249 N. Y. 60, 162 N. E. 584 (1928); (1928) 26 Mica L REv. 942;
Comment (1931) 44 EMav. I. R v. 623, 625.
156. 107 Conn. 181, 139 AtI. 695 (1928), 59 A.L.R. 599 (1929), commented on in
(192S) 26 Mica. L. REv. 942. Though the court in this case repudiated the notion that
unjust enrichment is a sine qua non of recovery, it stopped short of granting full pro-
tection to the reliance interest, since it excluded from compensation expenses incurred
by the plaintiff in refitting the premises for a second purchaser after the defendant had
refused to go on with the contract. If in fact these expenses would have been incurred
had no contract with the defendant been entered, obviously they should not be included
in the plaintiff's recovery. But there is some reason to suppose that they consisted at
least in part of the cost of undoing the special alterations made for the defendant, and
the court rested its objection, not on the ground that these expenses were not caused
by the defendant's contract or his breach, but on the view that to allow such items
"would be, in effect, to permit a recovery on an unenforceable contract."
In certain early Pennsylvania cases (cited and discussed note 167, infra) a recovery
of the reliance interest was allowed on indefinite contracts to adopt or "treat as my own
child." This rule has subsequently been swallowed up by a later rule that even when
a contract to adopt is definite in its terms recovery thereon is limited to the reliance
interest.
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ing the premises to conform to certain requests made by the vendee
after the contract had been entered.
The cases discussed later'5 \vhere a contract is terminable at the will
of one or both parties may also be considered as relevant to the subject
of this section, since such contracts are indefinite with respect to the
time of their duration.
BARGAINS RELATING TO A SUBJECT MATTER NoN-COmMERCIAL
IN NATURE
The fact that an arrangement entered into by two persons can be
construed as a "bargain" throws little light on its social and institutional
background. The notion of reciprocity permeates human society, and
there are few relations entered voluntarily by individuals - whether
economic, political, or "social"--in which an element of exchange or
barter may not be discerned. That it would be inappropriate to apply
to many of these relationships the rules developed to regulate commer-
cial transactions is obvious. It is, however, a gross simplification of the
problem presented by "social" and "moral" agreements to assume a clean
split between those promises which are "legally binding" and those which
are without legal effect.' Two complicating variables prevent any such
sharp dichotomy. In the first place, the "binding" effect of a promise
is a matter of degree, proceeding on an ascending scale which embraces,
in order, the iestitution, reliance, and expectation interests. In the second
place, it is obvious that the commercial or non-commercial quality of an
agreement is also a matter of degree. As we approach gradually the
pattern of the business bargain, and as the need for legal intervention
correspondingly increases, the judicial recognition of that need may be
expected to reflect a hierarchic division of contract claims, the various
interests finding recognition in the order of their urgency.
There are, no doubt, agreements so remote from the considerations
which surround the bargain of commerce that any enforcement of them
-even to the extent of the restitution interest-would properly be denied.
To be placed in this class are probably many of the agreements made
between husband and wife concerning their domestic affairs.' On the
157. See p. 414 ff., infra.
158. In dealing with the problem of "moral agreements,' the texts make no dis-
tinction between contract interests; they assume that there either is, or is not, "a con-
tract." See, for example, I WLSmiO, CONTRACrS (2nd ed. 1936) § 21.
159. The great variety of theories on the basis of which legal sanction has been
denied such agreements stands in strange contrast to the regularity with which enforce-
ment is refused. Balfour v. Balfour [1919] 2 Y. B. 571 (the parties had no intention to
create a legal obligation); Ryan v. Dockery, 134 Wis. 431, 114 N. W. 820 (1908)
(consideration lacking); Miller v. .Miller, 78 Iowa 177, 35 N. W. 464 (1887) (tho
Vrol. 46: 373396
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other hand, the special urgency of the restitution interest, and its prior-
ity over the other contract interests, ieems to be reflected in certain cases
where a defendant has promised some recompense in return for domestic
services rendered by a member of his household. There is a tendency
in these cases to compel the promisor to pay for benefits actually re-
ceived. In many of the cases it is difficult to tell on which of two
theories the court is proceeding: (1) that the liability is quasi-contrac-
tual, the defendant's promise of compensation serving merely to rebut
the implication of a gift which would otherwise arise from the relation-
ship of the parties;160 or (2) that the suit is "on" the contract, the
defendant's promise, whatever its actual terms, being construed as an
undertaking to pay the reasonable value of the services received.1 ' Ac-
tually, of course, the scope of the defaulting promisor's liability remains
the same whichever juristic construction is adopted-a circumstance
which suggests that an analysis in terms of promissory interests is of
greater significance than the conventional treatment in terms of the
"nature" of the liability, and what it is "on."
Our concern here is primarily with those cases where judicial inter-
vention is broad enough to include a protection of the reliance interest.
The contracts about to be discussed stand, as it were, on the threshold
of commerce. They are, on the one hand, too "social" in nature to be
given the full legal sanction accorded business agreements. On the
other hand, they are close enough to the pattern of the commercial bar-
gain to demand that those who have relied on them be made whole.
Before discussing these cases, however, it should .be remarked that they
probably do not adequately indicate the extent to which the reliance
interest has received recognition - covertly- -in the field of "moral"
bargains. There are, for example, many contracts which are enforced,
even to the extent of the expectancy,. after they have been relied on,
which would, in all probability, have been branded as mere "social ar-
rangements" without legal effect had suit been brought on the executory
agreement. This is probably true of cases like Hamer v. Sidway,e where
agreement was without conideration and against public policy) ; Merrill v. Peaslee, 146
Mass. 460, 16 N. E. 271 (188) ("the fellowship of the wife is not an article of trade
between husband and wife").
160. Certain of the cases are so construed in VOODWA,, QuAsX Co:nuTicrs (1913)
§51.
161. See the cases collected in Note (190S) 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 873, 904-906. In
his discussion of cases of this general type, Havighurst discerns as the factor most
prominently influencing the judicial attitude toward a claim to payment for household
services "the degree to which the work has benefited the defendant." Havighurst,
Serices hn the Home -A Study of Contract Concepts in Domestic Rclatlions (1932) 41
YALE L. J. 386, 390.
162. 124 N. Y. 538, 27 N. E. 256 (1891).
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a nephew, who had, in reliance on a promise by his uncle, denied him-
self for five years the pleasures of alcohol, nicotine, and blasphemy, was
allowed to recover the promised reward. It is certainly doubtful whether
such a contract would have been enforced as an executory agreement.
Attorney-Client Contracts. The legal status accorded the attorney's
claim to his fee will depend upon the attitudes which surround the legal
profession itself. The rule adopted may vary all the way from that
followed in England-that the barrister has no legal claim agaifist his
client for his fee, not even in quantum meruit' 03-to that prevailing in
the majority of the American, states, which (so far as the measure of
damage. is concerned) treats the contract of attorney and client like any
other business agreement. Out interest here lies in an intermediate view
expressed in Martin v. Camp"0 4 and adopted in a number of jurisdic-
tions. According to this view the client may discharge an attorney em-
ployed for a particular litigation at any time, with no other liability
than that of reimbursing the attorney for what he had done at the time
of his discharge. Though the decisions do not clearly define the scope
of the client's liability, it apparently extends to the reliance interest of
the attorney,""5 and remains restricted to that interest until the attorney
163. 2 HAr.sBua,'s LAWS OF ENGLAND (2d ed. 1931) 518.
164. 219 N. Y. 170, 114 N. E. 46 (1916). For a bibliography on the problems
presentEd by Martin v. Camp, see ARAnT, CASES oN TH. AMJEICAN BAR AND ITS ETrICS
(1933) 357, note 12. The rule of Martin v. Camp is not applied to contracts of general
retainer. Id. at 176, 114 N. E. at 48; Greenberg v. Remick & Co., 230 N. Y. 70, 129
N. E. 211 (1920); Roxana Petroleum Co. v. Rice, 109 Okla. 161, 235 Pac. 502 (1925).
It is obvious that such contracts more nearly approach the pattern of the ordinary
contract of employment than does the agreement engaging an attorney for a particular
litigation.
165. A suit by the discharged attorney would not usually involve any distinction
betveen the restitution and reliance interests. However, in view of the rule generally
prevailing in this country (which gives the attorney the lost profit), it seems a safe
assumption that the relief granted under Martin v. Camp would, in a proper case, be
extended to include items of reliance not benefiting the client. This is perhaps the
intended meaning of the enigmatic dictum in Martin v. Camp to the effect that the
rule limiting recovery to quantum meruit does not apply "where the attorney in entering
into such a contract has changed his position or incurred expense." Id. at 176, 114
N. E. at 48. Probably the court meant merely to say that if there were items of reliance
deserving reimbursement which were not subsumable under restitution ("quantum
meruit'), the recovery would be broadened to include them. To attribute to the court's
language the meaning that if the attorney has in any way changed his position in enter-
ing the contract, he becomes entitled to the expectation interest, would involve an ab-
surdity condemned in Comment (1920) 30 Y .Am L. 3. 514, 519, and embraced in Roxana
Petroleum Co. v. Rice, 109 Okla. 161, 235 Pac. 502 (1925). Such an interpretation of
the dictum would leave no field of application for the rule of the case in view of the
fact that an attorney always "changes his position!' in entering a contract with the
client at least to the extent of foregoing the opportunity of representing the other side.
(Whether reliance of this sort should be regarded as compensable on its own account is
a debatable point; see p. 413, infra).
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has, without meanwhile being discharged, fully performed I-s side of
the agreement, wheri the client becomes liable to pay the promised fee.
Contracts to Adopt and to Marry. Reference has already been madelca
to the rule, firmly established in Pennsylvania, which limits recovery by
the foster child on a contract to adopt to the reliance interest.Ier
Apparently it is only in the common law that the betrothal has been
given, among other attributes favorable to the plaintiff, the status of a
business bargain. Civil law countries know nothing of our rule which
defines the damages recoverable for breach of such a "contract" so as to
include the lost profit-here euphemized as "the worldly advantage of
the marriage."'6 3 There are signs that this rule is, even with us, due for
166. At p. 65, supra.
167. In the cases where this rule originated, the limitation of recovery to the reliance
interest was rested in part on the fact that the particular contracts involved were in-
definite in their terms. Graham v. Grahams Executors, 34 Pa. 475 (1859) ; Polloc: v.
Ray, 85 Pa. 423 (1877) ; Krauss v. Rohner, 172 Pa. 431, 33 Atl. 1016 (1396). Apparently
the first application of the rule to a contract not subject to the objection of indefinite-
ness was in Sandham v. Grounds, 94 Fed. 83 (C. C.A. 3rd, 1899), a case purporting to
apply Pennsylvania law. Since that decision, the rule has been treated by the Penn-
sylvania court 'as applicable to cases where the terms of the contract were definite.
In re Carroll's Estate, 219 Pa. 440, 63 At. 1033 (190); Davies' Estate, 29 Pa. 579,
137 AtI. 728 (1927). The holding in Sandham v. Grounds, stpra, and the language in
In re Carroll's Estate, make it clear that the relief is conceived of as extending to items
of reliance not subsumable under the restitution interest. While apparently the only
explicit recognition of this rule is to be found in Pennsylvania, there are, apparently,
no cases squarely contrary to it,4-that is, cases measuring money damages on a contract
to adopt by the value of the expectancy. Though many states grant what Pennsylvania
refuses; that is, "specific performance!' of the contract against the dead foster parent's
estate, this remedy is, as we have pointed out before (note 15, sitpra), subject to special
considerations, and it by no means follows from the fact that this relief is given that
damages would be measured by the expectancy if suit were brought against the foster
parent during his life, or that specific performance would be granted if the foster
parent had repudiated the contract during his life.
168. The Gm.sus CnIM CODE limits liability generally to reimbursement for ex-
penses reasonably paid or incurred in contemplation of the marriage. The liability also
extends to such losses as the giving up of an employment, but is held by the courts not
to include the loss of other opportunities of marriage. Where seduction has taken place,
recovery by the woman may include "non-property" elements, principally the damage
to her prospects of marriage. Busch, DAs BORGOrwcCEM GEssrznucH (1929) §§ 1293-
1300, and the annotations thereto. The liability seems to be construed as contractual,
but where the engagement was induced by fraud or other wrongful means a "tort'
action may be brought under § 826. Id. at § 1293, note 6.
The Swiss law is substantially the same as the German, except that seduction is
not necessary to broaden the recovery to include "non-property" elements, the wider
recovery being permitted where the breach of the engagement works "serious injury"
to the innocent party in his "personal relations" Zrvr.(;srznucII §§ 91-93.
The FRnnca Cmrv. CODE omits any mention of the contract to marry, but judicial
practice gives the recovery about the same scope as in Switzerland. Where in Germany
and Switzerland the breach is actionable, if it causes damage, unless excused, in France
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an early demise. It is not clear, however, that the proper cure for the
situation has been adopted by.those legislatures which have recently abol-
ished the action for "breach of promise" altogether.100 A sensible com-
promise of the interests involved would silggest allowing the aggrieved
person at least reimbursement for expenditures made in expectation of
the marriage.' 0 Whether the recovery should extend to the whole reliance
the breach itself must be reprehensible; the formula generally employed is that there
be at least "caprice o l~gUret:" The "theory" of the action seems not to be consistently
defined by the courts. While often referred to as delictual, the Court of Cassation has
applied to the recovery the (not inflexible) requirement of written proof contained in
§ 1341 of the Code, a Section generally applicable only to suits for breach of contract.
The liability has sometimes been brought under the theory of the "abis des droils," the
contract being viewed as terminable at the will of either party, the repudiating party
being liable only for an abusive exercise of his power of termination. 2 PLANIO. ET
RrPERr, DROIT CiVIL (1926) §§ 80-87.
The law of other civil law countries seems, 'where recovery is permitted at all, not
to deviate radically frQm that of the three countries mentioned.
169. The statutes are reviewed in Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart Balm"
(1935) 33 MicH. L. R~a. 979. The author suggests that an action for "special'damages"
may possibly survive these statutes. Id. at 1000.
170. This proposal has often been made. See 1 VmaaiER, AMEMCnAN FAIltY LAWS
(1931) 29; Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart Bahn" (1935) 33 Mien. L. REv.
979; 985; report adopted by the Association of the Bar of the City of Nev York, as
reported in the New York Times, Feb. 14, 1935, p. 44, col. 2. New York Assembly Bill
No. 1848, which passed the Assembly but was never voted on in the Senate, limited
recovery to "actual expenses paid or incurred in contemplation of marriage." Feinsinger,
loc. dt. spra at 985, note 38. A similar bill was carried in the' House of Commons in
1879. White, Breach of Promise of Marriage (1894) 10 L. Q. REV. 135, 142.
McCormick proposes that Ave "eliminate as an item of damage the one contractual
elemen' (i. e., the lost profit) and place the liability "purely on the basis of compensation
for harm inflicted by a tort." McCoumicx, DAmAG-s (1935) 405. In curious contrast
to this proposal are criticisms of the common law because it "anomalously applied the
tort rather than the contract rules of recovery" to breach of promise suits. Feinsinger,
loc. cit. supra at 983; see also Wright, The Action for Breach of the Marriage Promise
(1924) 10 VA. L. REv. 361, 370. Incongruous as these two lines of criticism may seem,
there is an element of truth in both of them,-a circumstance -which demonstrates that
the real need is for a redefinition of the interests protected, without reference to the
labels "contrace' and "tort." If, however, one wishes to insist on assigning a "theory"
to the liability, the preferable theory would seem to be that of a contractual liability
for the reliance interest (excluding the loss, of other opportunities to marry). By defin-
ing the action as contractual, the elimination of punitive damages could be accomplished
without any backsliding from the demands of juristic elegance; with both punitive
damages and the lost profit excluded, evidence of the defendant's wealth would become
inadmissible, 'and the general atmosphere of the trial would be such as to restrain the
much-feared wayward impulses of the jury. If it were thought wise to make' com-
pensable injury to the plaintiff's reputation, this would perhaps best be conceived as a
distinct claim, in order to prevent the procedural implications of this item of recovery
from contaminating the whole trial.-
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interest, including the loss of other opportunities of marriage, is more
doubtful. 7
Contracts Affecting the Right of Pivacy. Still another type of con-
tract on which recovery may properly be limited to the reliance interest
is suggested by the French case of Dun.as v. Liibert.' In that case
Alexandre Dumas pare had posed for photographs in the company of
la demoiselle Adah Menken. No charge was made by the photographer,
and under the custom prevailing at the time there arose from Dumas'
acceptance of copies of the photograph an implied agreement that the
photographer might sell other copies to the public. The court held, how-
ever, that the agreement was subject to the condition that Dumas might
withdraw his consent to the sale of his photograph on reimbursing the
photographer for expenditures made in reliance on the contract. A note
by the Reporter suggests that such a result is properly reached, because
of the peculiar subject matter of the contract, even if it had been ex-
pressly agreed that the photographer might sell an unlimited number
of copies to the public.
THE MEASURE oF RErCOVERY UNDER SECTION 90 OF THE
RESTATELIENTi ";
Section 90 of the Contiacts Restatement' provides in effect that seri-
ous reliance may under some circumstances make "binding" a promise
for which nothing has been given or promised in exchange. The vital
question of the precise extent to which the promise is "binding" is left
without explicit answer in the Restatement. In a discussion before the
American Law Institute, however, the Reporter took tie position that
the promise, if enforced at all, must be enforced to the full extent of
the expectation interest. 75 Even without this insight into the legisla-
tive intention, one might perhaps have deduced this result from the
systematics of the Restatement. The chapter on damages nowhere re-
gards the reimbursement of detrimental reliance as offering in itself
171. See p. 417-418, infra.
172. Paris, fay 25, 1867, Sirey, Lois et ArrZts, 1868, 2, p. 41.
173. For previous discussions of this problem see pp. 64, 69, 80, mipra and 420,
infra.
174. "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promlsee and which
does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise." Where an act or promise has been "bargained for and
given in exchange for the promise' (§75), §90 has no application, and the promise is
binding without reference to the equitable qualifications (". . . of a definite and sub-
stantial . .. ". ... if injustice . . ") contained in § 90.
175. See the quotation given .mpra, at 64, note 14.
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a proper concern for contract law.170  Furthermore, when Section 90
itself states that the reliance which makes the.promise "binding" must
be of a "definite and substantial character," some criterion is obviously
assumed by reference to which it may be decided whether the reliance
in a particular case is sufficiently "definite and substantial." Since no
other criterion is stated, the natural inference is that the reliance must
be so "definite and substantial" as to justify an enforcement of the
whole promise. If the intention had been merely that the reliance should
be "definite and substantial" enough to justify a law suit, one would
expect to find that meaning made explicit.
When we attempt to discover what measure of recovery has actually
been applied by the courts to promises coming within Section 90, .we
encounter the difficulty that there was, prior to the Restatement, no
recognition in judicial opinions that there was any such rule of law as
that stated in Section 90. As the Reporter has recognized, Section 90
makes explicit a principle which had previously lain implicit in widely
scattered groups of cases.1 7 It is to these groups of cases, therefore,
that we must turn to determine the "measure of recovery" under Sec-
tion 90.
One line of decisions which entered into the synthesis achieved in
Section 90 is that having to do with the situation where a man has
acted in reliance on a gratuitous license concerning the use of land. On
the one extreme, there are cases denying that the unbargained-for reli-
ance of the licensee can give him any right to a continuance of the
license, and at the other, there are cases conferring on the licensee a
permanent easement.'78 Between these two extremes, however, are tP be
found a substantial number of cases in which an intermediate view has
been taken. In addition to frequent judicial statements that the license
may be revoked if compensation is made to the licensee for his change
of position, 70 there are cases holding that the natural destruction of
176. § 333 provides for the reimbursement of expenditures in performing or In
preparing to perform a contract, but this relief is construed as founded on the expecta-
tion interest (see p. 90, supra), and §333 is, in any event, not so phrased as to include
reliance of the type involved in cases coming under § 90, since such reliance can scarcely
be considered "performance of the contract' or "necessary preparation, therefor." (See
p. 95, .supra).
177. See the Explanatory Note to § 90 printed in AuPc.Ax LAW IN sTiTUTE, RE-
STATEMENT OF CONTRA CTS, Chapters 1-7 (1928) 245 et seq.
178. The more important decisions are discussed in CLAiuc, REAL COVENA1TS AND
OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "Rux WITH LAND" (1929) 46-51.
179. "Nor is it necessary, in order to do justice . . . to hold that the license is
not revocable at the pleasure of the licensor; but in such cases equity may impose, as a
condition of such revocation, that the licensee may remove his improvements, if that
can be accomplished without material loss, or, if not, that the licensor shall make just
compensation therefor, as the circumstances of the case may require." Flick v. Bell,
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the structure erected by the-licensee terminates the license,180 and cases
limiting the injunctive relief granted against the licensor to the natural
life of the improvements made in reliance on the license3 l In these
decisions the scope of judicial intervention is set by the reliance interest,
or at least the relief granted represents the most feasible approximation
of that interest.'
Another ingredient of the synthesis in Section 90 consists of a "large
body of cases ordinarily classified under the heading of "Vaiver.' ,m
Naturally, where waiver is involved the problem of the interest pro-
tected is not a matter of the measure of damages, since damages are
not sought for "breach" of the waiver. The question is rather, how
completely does a waiver dispense with the condition or defense waived;
is its scope in this respect set by its terms or by the extent of the bene-
fited party's reliance? The theory of the Restatement seems to be that
the legal effect of a waiver is measured by its own terms so soon as it
has given rise to a serious change of position.8 4 It is very doubtful
whether the cases bear this out. On the contrary, the scope which the
courts give the waiver seems to be determined, not by the expectation
it created, but by the need for saving the relying party from prejudice s5
5 Cal. Unrep. 206, 210, 42 Pac. 813, 815 (1895). See also Ferguson v. Spencer, 127 Ind.
66, 68, 25 N. E. 1039, 1036 (1890) ; Oster v. Broe, 161 Ind. 113, 64 N. . 918 (1902),
(1903) 16 HMv. L. REv. 226; Johnson v. Bartron, 23 N. D. 629, 137 N. IV. 1092 (1912),
(1913) 26 Hxv. L. Ray. 376; and cases discussed in Note (1900) 49 L. R. A. 497,
525-526.
180. Allen v. Fiske, 42 Vt. 462 (1869); Ainsworth v. Stone, 73 Vt. 101, 50 AtL
805 (1901) ; see Ameriscoggin .Bridge v. Bragg, 11 N. H. 102, 109 (1840) ; Carleton v.
Redington, 21 N. H. 291, 307 (1850); Comment (1911) 11 Cor. L RE. 76, 78.
181. Grimshaw v. Belcher, 88 Cal. 217, 26 Pac. 84 (1891); Clark v. Glidden, 60
-Vt. 702, 15 At. 358 (1888) ; Phillips v. Cutter, 89 Vt. 233, 95 AtL 487 (1915).
182. Of course, in informal arrangements of the sort here involved the exMct scope
of the expectancy may be difficult to determine, and it would be possible to reconcile
the decisions cited in the last two notes with Professor Williston's view by interpreting
the informal license as being intended only to last for the life of any structure which
might be built, thus making the expectation interest identical with the reliance interest.
This construction of the relief granted would, however, scarcely be consistent with the
reasoning in the decisions cited, where the whole emphasis was placed on the need
for compensating the plaintiff's change of position. Thus in Clark v. Glidden, 60 Vt.
702, 15 At. 358 (1888), the court gave as its reason for protecting the plaintiff's right
during the life of the aqueduct that "no use short of that would give the oratrL-: the
full benefit of her expenditure." Id. at 710, 15 Atl. at 362.
183. Quoted from the Explanatory Note cited note 177, mepra.
184. "If the expression of willingness is or has become a binding promise before a
retraction, the promisor's duty is determined by that promise. Any reliance thereafter
is immaterial, though it may have been action in reliance oa the promise that made it
binding.' §297, comment a. See also §88(2); cf. §300, illustration 2.
185. Thus, in contracts calling for a series of performances over a period of time,
it is held that a waiver of defects or delays in performance, though binding to the
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Tending in the same direction as the two groups of cases just dis-
cussed are those which have held that an estoppel in pais imposes only
a liability for the reliance interest 80  In view of the difficulty of dis-
tinguishing between promises and representations, and in view of the
fact that it is doubtful whether such a distinction is, in any event, worth
taking, those decisions are all relevant to the present discussion. Two
of them, which involve "representations" clearly promissory in nature,
are directly in point
8 7
extent relied on, may be retracted as to the future by giving reasonable notice. See the
cases collected in Notes (1920) 9 A. L. R. 996, 1002-1006, (1921) 14 A. L. R. 1209,
1233-1236, (1931) 75 A. L. R. 609, 620-623; and RESTATE E T, CoNAcrs (1932) § 300,
illustration 2. Of course, in these cases the waiver arises by implication from the
repeated acceptance of defective or delayed instalments, and it is possible to argue that
no expectation of a continuance of the indulgence for any particular length of time is
justified. However, the reasoning in the decisions indicates that the courts are not, in
any event, concerned with the question what expectation was justified, but entirely
with saving the relying party from prejudice. Thus, in Portland Ice Co. v. Connor, 32
Pa. Super. Ct. 428 (1907), a provision for weekly settlement had for more than a year
been, in the court's words, "a dead letter:' until the, seller attempted to revive it by
notice to the buyer. The court did not inquire whether the seller's conduct justified
the buyer in believing that the benefit of this provision had been permanently surrendered
by the seller, but instead held that it was a question for the jury whether the seller had
given the buyer sufficient time to accommodate himself to the situation created by the
demand for weekly payments.
Furthermore, the same principle seems to be applied in cases where a definite time Is
set for the duration of the waiver. If a debtor's rights (in a pledge, for example) are
subject to forfeiture upon failure to pay his debt by a stated time, even though the
creditor in advance of the 'due date grants a definiti extension of time, it has been held
that the creditor may, by giving reasonable notice, demand payment before the period
of extension has expired. Thayer v. Meeker, 86 Ill. 470 (1877); Scheersschmidt v.
Smith, 74 Minn. 224, 77 N. W. 34 (1898); Rosenthal v. Brown, 247 N. Y. 479, 160
N. E. 921 (1928). Here the debtor's prejudice through reliance (subjecting himself'
to a forfeiture) is cured, not by giving him the expectancy (a definite extension), but
by giving him a chance to undo the effects of his reliance. § 311 of the Restatement
seems, in its implications, contrary to the cases just cited. That section provides that a
party granting an extension may revoke the extension by giving reasonable notice where
the extension granted was of indefinite duration. The implication seems to be that If
the extension is for a definite period, the waiver cannot be withdrawn. If, as his treat-
ment of Rosenthal 'v. Brown, mtpra (see 3 Wmiusoxr, ONRAncGrs (2nd ed. 1936) § 689,
note 14) might indicate, Professor Williston's interpretation of cases of this sort Is
that there is really no detrimental reliance involved in subjecting one's self to a forfeiture
if the court prevents that forfeiture by requiring reasonable notice, then the qualification
contained in §311 seems to lose intelligibility altogether. In other words, unless §.311
means to lay down a rule contrary to Rosenthal v. Brown, supra, it is difficult to find any
explanation for the qualification it contains.
186. See note 193, infra.
187. Decatur v. Cooper, 85 N. H. 250, 157 Atl. 706 (1931), and G. S. Johnson Co.
v. Nevada Packard Mines Co., 272 Fed. 291 (D. Nev. 1920), discussed in note 193, inira.
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There are, of course, many cases in -which, without discussing the
problem at all, courts have assumed that a promise made enforceable by
unbargained-for reliance should permit as broad a recovery as any con-
tract In a good many of these cases, the reliance and expectation in-
terests would yield the same measure of relief 388 Where there is a
discrepancy between the two interests, a court would wisely choose in
many situations to protect the expectation interest' 8 Certeainy one
would not be disposed to quarrel with this result in the charitable sub-
scription cases, or in those cases where by granting specific performance
of the promise all difficulties of evaluation can be avoided1 00
What is needed is not a "rule of recovery" for Section 90, but a
recognition that the remedy must be adapted to the needs of the par-
ticular situation. Certainly no inflexible measure is suggested by the
decisions. Courts have, in fact, done at least four different things about
promises which have given rise to unbargained-for reliance: (1) noth-
ing, (2) granted restitution, (3) reimbursed the promisee's losses
through reliance, (4) secured for the promisee the expectancy or its
value. All of these possibilities are recognized in the Restatement except
the third. Section 90 itself leaves the court a discretion to refuse relief
altogether. Section 347(1) (b)'provides for a restitution of benefits. 1 '
188. As in Devecmon v. Shaw, 69 Md. 199, 14 At. 464 (18R), where the promise
was, in effect, to reimburse reliance; and in Siegel v. Spear, 234 N. Y. 479, 133 N. F.
414 (1923), where the promise -as to insure and the reliance cdnsisted in not insuring.
189. It is difficult to agree with the position apparently taken by Gardner, that
damages for breach of a promise coming within § 90 should always be limited to reim-
bursing reliance. Gardner, An Inquiry into the Prhiidples of the Law of Contraqts (1932)
46 MA.v. L. REV. 1, 22-23; criticized in (1935) 49 H ARv. L. REv. 336, 337. Also ques-
tionable is the historical observation made by Gardner; which attributes the previous
reluctance of courts to interfere in cases of this sort to an erroneous assumption that
they had to give all or nothing, and which attempts to explain the growth of the prin-
ciple of § 90 as arising from a discovery that relief might be limited to the indemnifi-
cation of loss. Certainly the si:x cases cited have little tendency to prove this thesis,
in view of the fact that in all but one of them the expectation and reliance interests
would yield the same measure of damages.
190. The most common case where specific performance is granted is where, in
reliance on an oral gift of land, the donee has gone into possession and made improve-
ments. Even in this situation, however, it has been held that the donee's only remedy is
a suit to obtain reimbursement (Usher's Ex'r v. Flood, 33 Ky. 552 (186)), the recovery
being apparently measured by the cost of the improvements rather than the benefit to
the donor (Hamilton v. Hamilton, 5 Lith 29 (Ky. 1824)). This view would perhaps
generally be taken in those states which have held that part performance of a contract
for the sale of land does not take it out of the Statute of Frauds. See note 141, .tipra.
Even in jurisdictions granting specific performance, it has been stated that this relief
YAH not be granted where compensation can be made in damages. Ballard v. Ward, $9
Pa. 358 (1879); see also the Massachusetts cases cited in 2 WL[mu[, Co-,.=crs (2d
ed. 1936) § 494, note 12.
191. In his discussion before the American Law Institute (Pocmra nIs, Vol. IV,
Appendix (1926) 91), Professor Williston recognized that a court would properly be
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Only the reimbursement of losses through reliance is excluded-and
that because this kind of relief is, forsooth, not "contractual."
LIABILITY FOR MI]SREPRESENTAT.ION
Estoppel in pais. Does the liability which results from an estoppel
in pais extend to the expectation interest, or is it confined to the reliance
interest? If the estoppel mechanism be taken at its face value, it leads
to a recovery measured by the representee's expectation. There is, fur-
thermore, a strong judicial impulse to- take the mechanism at its face
value. To adopt a measure of recovery inconsistent with the "theory"
of the liability would tend to undermine faith in the doctrine of estoppel
itself, and might place the court under the embarrassment of having to
find a new explanation for the liability. The writers have generally as-
sumed without discussion that the liability extends to the expectation
interest.192
On the other hand, an inquiry into the purposes underlying the mech-
anism reveals no reason why the liability should not, in a proper case,
be restricted to the reliance interest, and in a substantial number of
decisions the relief granted has been so limited. 93 It is probable, how-
more liberal in awarding restitution than it would be in "enforcing the promise," and
argued that the existence of this more generously granted relief justified limiting rather
severely the recovery granted under § 90. Yet § 347(1) (b) provides that restitution
may be had only where the promise might have been enforced under § 901 (It should be
recalled, however, that Professor Corbin was Reporter for the chapter containing § 347).
192. 3.'WiuLSTrox, CoTpACTrs (1920) §1514; Wigmore, The Scindific Role of
Consideration in Contract, LEGAL ESSAYS mn TRiBuTE To Oax KiP McMURtRAt (1935)
641, 650; BrGELOW, ESTOPPEL (6th ed. 1913) 710. Since the brief discussion in -EwAr,
ESTOPPEL (1900) 191-195, there has been almost no recognition in the literature that
any such problem as the "measure of recovery" in estoppel exists. Cf. the casual
references to the problem in Comments (1913) 26 HAnv. L. REv. 349, 350, (1924)
38 HIAv. L. REv. 239, 243.
193. In the following cases, where a debtor was estopped to plead the defense of
usury against an assignee of the claim, his liability was limited to reimbursing the as-
signee for the amount actually paid for the claim: Campbell v. Nichols, 33 N. J. Law 81
(Sup. Ct. 1868); Payne v. Burnham, 62 N. Y. 69 (1875); Miller v. Zeimer, 111 N. Y.
441, 18 N.E. 716 (1888); Cross v. Smith, 85 Hun 49, 32 N. Y. Supp. 671 (1895);
Verity v. Sternberger, 62 App. Div. 112, 70 N. Y. Supp. 894 (1901).
In the following decisions (not involving usury) the effect of the estoppel was restricted
to accomplishing a reimbursement for change of position: G. S. Johnson Co. v. Nevada
Packard Mines Co., 272 Fed. 291 (D. Nev. 192.0); Lindsay v. Cooper, 94 Ala. 170,
11 So. 325 (1891) ; Conway Nat. Bank v. Pease, 76 N. H. 319, 82 At. 1068 (1912) ;
Decatur v. Cooper, 85 N. H. 250, 157 Att. 706 (1931); Wormser v. Rubinstein, 89
Misc. 388, 151 N. Y. Supp. 911 (1915); Parsons v. Lipe, 158 Misc. 32, 286 N. Y. Supp.
60 (1933), aff'd, 243 App. Div. 681, 277 N. Y. Supp. 426, 428 (1935), aff'd, 269 N. Y.
630, 200 N. E. 31 (1936)..
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ever, that in most of the cases where an estoppel is applied the repre-
sentor has been compelled to make good the expectancy created by his
assertion.'" The factors -which should influence the choice between the
two measures probably do not differ radically from those discussed in
the section on deceit.
The Agent's Implied Warranty of Authority. Whether the agent's
liability on an implied representation of authority should extend to the
expectation interest or be confined to the reliance interest is made de-
Dicta limiting the effect of the estoppel to the reliance interest are to be found in
Peacock v. Home, 159 Ga. 707, 727, 126 S. E. 813, 823 (1925) ; Phillipsburgh Ban: v.
Fulmer, 31 N. J. Law 52, 56 (Sup. Ct. 1864); Green v. Stevenson, 54 S. A. 1011,
1015 (Tenn. 1899); In re Romford Canal Co., 24 Ch. Div. 85, 93 (1883); cf. Baker
v. Wood, 157 U. S. 212, 219 (1894). In 2 Surri's LADINTG CASES (Sth Am. d. 1885)
861, it is said that "equity will not carry the estoppel of an admission farther than is
requisite to indemnify the person whom it misled," with a possible implication that the
rule may be different in law. In Comment (1924) 38 Hnv. I. RLv. 239, 243, the
assertion is made that the weight of authority "limits recovery to the amount lost by
reason of the misrepresentation."
Statements are to be found in many cases to the general effect that the whole function
of an estoppel is to prevent loss and that it cannot be made "an instrument of gain."
But in most of the cases where this statement occurs there is in fact no showing of
detrimental reliance and therefore no occasion for even a restricted application of the
estoppel. See, for example, Adler v. Pin, SO Ala. 351, 355 (1885); Little ,. Union Oil
Co., 73 Cal. App. 612, 621, 238 Pac. 1066, 1069 (1925); Llano Granite & Marble Co.
v. Hollinger, 212 S. W. 151, 153 (Tex. Comm. App. 1919).
The view that the scope of the estoppel should be limited by the reliance interest does
not necessarily entail the conclusion that one who claims by transfer from the original
representee can obtain no more than reimbursement for his own reliance. To protect
adequately the original representee it may be necessary to confer on his transferee all
of the rights he possessed, even though the result is to give the transferee more than
is necessary to make him whole. Thus in Gamble v. School District, 146 Fed. 113
(C. C. A. 8th, 1906) (reversing 132 Fed. 514 (C. C. N. D. Iowa, 1904), (1905) 18 HAM.
L. REv. 302), the plaintiff bought for $50 an irregularly issued municipal bond for
which his assignor had paid the par value, $1000. It was held that since his transferor
was entitled to assert an estoppel against the issuing school district to the full amount
of the bond, he succeeded to all the rights of his transferor.
194. This result flows so naturally from the "theory" of the estoppel that in most
cases it is reached without any discussion at all. Among the few decisions where the
problem of the interest protected has been raised, and resolved in favor of the expecta-
tion interest, may be listed Tobey v. Chipman, 95 Mass. 123 (1866) ; Fall River Nat'l
Bank v. Buffinton, 97 Mass. 493 (1867) ; Colonial Theatrical Enterprises -. Sage, 255
Mich. 160, 237 N. IV. 529 (1931); Park v. Hudson, 154 Minn. 471, 192 N. V. 112
(1923) ; Grissler v. Powers, 8I N. Y. 57 (180) ; Ewing v. Dominion Bank, 35 Can.
S. C. 133 (1904) (criticized in Alward, A New Phasc of Equitable Estoppel (1905)
19 HARv. L. REv. 113). In Colonial Theatrical Elterpriscs v'. Sage, supra, however,
the court said, "The doctrine [of estoppel], being equitable, is dependent upon the
circumstances, and the relief ranges from mere reimbursement to putting the party
entitled to its benefit in the same position as if the thing represented was true." (Id.
at 171, 237 N. W. at 532.)
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pendent by the German Civil Code upon the good -faith of the agent.',
Our own decisions yield a less explicit answer to the question.
The older cases tended to hold the agent whose promise failed to
bind his principal as if he had made a contract on his own behalf, the
principal's name being, in imagination, "stricken out as mere surplus-
age."'19 This view of the "nature" of the agent's liability would seem
naturally to measure the third party's recovery by the expectation inter-
est; but, as was remarked in one New York decision, 07 most of the
cases proceeding on this theory were cases where the plaintiff had already
performed his side of the contract. Granting the expectancy (the con-
tract price) -in such cases is, of course, the most natural and the most
certain method of reimbursing the plaintiff's reliance.
The theory of the agent's liability now prevailing rests it upon a
tacit contract by the agent, "the implied warranty of authority." From
this "theory". of the liability, nothing follows automatically concerning
the measure of damages. The implied contract may be merely a con-
tract to make good out-of-pocket losses, or it inay be viewed as a con-
tract to assuage the third party's disappointment in not receiving the
expected right against the principal. Though the view that the agent's
,liability on the implied warranty extends to the expectation interest has
the support of the Agency Restatement, 18 and a considerable number
of decisions, 9 at least one case, Tedder v. Higgl,20" has squarely lim-
195. § 172. The liability of the agent may not in any event exceed the expectation
interest. See sup'ra, p. 75, n. 36; p. 80. The reduced recovery applies in favor of the
agent who ought to have known of his lack of authority, but who in fact believgd that
he was authorized to enter the transaction in question. See BUSCH, DAS BOnGERLxcnn
Gns=aznucH (1929), annotation to § 172. In other words, good faith rather than negli-
gence determines the scope of the liability-an approach which seems justifiable in vicw
of the difficulty of applying the concept of negligence to the agent's mistakes concerning
the extent of his authority.
196. The cases are collected in Notes (1926) 42 A. L. R 1310, (1929) 60 A. L. R.
1348.
197. Hegeman v. Johnson, 35 Barb. 200, 206 (N. Y. 1861). The court remarks that
the older cases in New York were either "cases of executed agreements-sales completed
by delivery," or involved written contracts. Of course, many-probably most-of the cases
involving written contracts (which would normally be promissory notes) were also cases
of executed agreements.
198. REsTATEmENT, AGENCY (1933) § 329, comment j.
199. The cases will be found collected in (1915) 25 YALE.L. J. 156; Note (1911)
34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 518.
200. 65 Fla. 153, 61 So. 244 (1913). In this case-sigisificautly a suit for the lost
Profit on an executory contract-the court said that whether the agent's liability "be
ex contractu or ex delicto, the gist of the action is the misrepresentation made by the
defendant to the plaintiff's pecuniary injury; and the purpose of the action is compen-
sation . . . Where a misrepresentation has been relied on by the plaintiff to" his
detriment, the measure of recovery is not the difference between the plaintiff's pecuniary
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ited the third party's recovery to the reliance interest. A similar limita-
tion may be implied in the Massachusetts view which rests the agent's
liability on "tort."'
Deceit. In view of the assumption, so frequently made, that any lia-
bility explicitly directed toward the reimbursement of reliance must rest
on "tort" rather than "contract," it is a trifle disorienting to discover
that in the case of the only tort which could possibly present a problem
of choosing between the reliance and expectation interests, namely, the
tort of deceit, the majority of the decisions have applied the "contract"
measure of recovery 22 Actually, the hierarchic order of the three in-
terests-here we may call them "interests in an affirmation"--is nowhere
more dearly exemplified than in the deceit cases. The restitution interest
is, of course, the most liberally protected, restitution being granted even
where the misrepresentation was innocent.20 3 The principle of hierarchic
division is carried a step farther in California; in that jurisdiction the
quality of the fraud involved may determine whether the defrauder is
held for the expectancy or only to reimburse losses through reliance.'01
condition if the representation had been true, and his condition under the actual facts,
but rather the difference between -what the plaintiff had before he acted on the repre-
sentation and what he had afterward:' Id. at 157, 61 So. at 245.
201. Mendelsohn v. Holton, 253 Mass. 362, 149 N. E. 38 (1925), (1926) 35 YALE
L. J. 625. It has been held that the expectation interest cannot be recovered where
the suit against the agent is in tort. Wallace v. Bentley, 77 Cal. 19, 18 Pac. 7S3 (183S);
Flora v. Hoet, 71 Colo. 273, 206 Pac. 381 (1922).
202. McComcn cites seven jurisdictions as applying the out-of-pocket-loss rule,
and twenty-right jurisdictions as applying the loss-of-bargain rule. DAMAGES (1935)
§ 121. He urges that choice between the two rules be made discretionary. Id. at 454.
203. This rule is usually stated in the form that "rescission" may be! had for inno-
cent misrepresentations. The need for analysing the problem in terms of the interest
protected, instead of in terms of the form of the remedy, becomes apparent however,
when the two quotations following are contrasted. "It is not necessary in order that
a contract may be rescinded for fraud or misrepresentation that the party making the
misrepresentation should have known that it was false . . . For . . . it would be
unjust to allow one who has made false representations even innocently, to retain the
fruits of a bargain induced by such representations.' 3 W ,LIsrmo, Cozrrnc's (1920)
§ 1500. '"n rescission, the plainiff's expenditures under the transaction are naturally
recoverable . . . " McComacz, DaMAGs (1935) 458, citing cases where on a
rescission the plaintiff was allowed reimbursement for expenditures not benefiting the
defendant. Actually, the whole notion that the suit to obtain restitution is founded on
a "rescission" represents a superfluous visualization of the remedy which serves often
to obscure the considerations of policy which ought to dictate the conditions and scope
of legal intervention. (See pp. 72-73, mtpra).
204. In Hines v. Brode, 168 Cal. 507, 511, 143 Pac. 729, 730 (1914) the court
declared that the loss-of-bargain rule is "the extreme rule" to be "applied only in
clear cases and upon just terms:' See, since that case, granting the expectancy, Porter
v. Hilton, 214 Cal. 705, 298 Pac. 501 (1931); and limiting recovery to the reliance
interest, Williams v. Spazier,'134 Cal. App. 340, 21 P. (2d) 470 (1933).
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Probably other jurisdictions will come to this view in the course of
time as "hard" cases, in both directions, arise to test their established
standards. As in other fields of the law, various factors may properly
influence the choice between the two interests: the degree of fault in-
volved in the misrepresentation; considerations of administrative con-
venience; the extent to which the representations were made in "the
course of business" and hence are subject to the considerations of policy
surrounding business bargains; whether the representations were ex-
press or implied.
THE LEGAL EFFECT OF THE REVOCATION OF AN
OFFER OR PROMISE
Corresponding to the notion that no middle ground is possible in the
enforcement of promises, is the assumption that the revocability of a
promise is a matter not subject to gradation. A promise is either re-
vocable, or irrevocable. Which it is, will depend on whether it had
become, at the time of the attempted revocation, a contract. Contracts
are irrevocable; promises which have not become contracts are mere
offers and are revocable.
A tacit acceptance of this simplistic conception of the problem of
revocability lies at the root of.a problem in legal theory much discussed
in our law. This is the problem conceived to be presented by the case
where A, without exacting any counter-promise, undertakes to pay a
reward for some act by B, and then revokes his promise after B has
begun, but before he has completed, the requested act. Because it is
assumed that there can be no "contract" until B has completed the act,
strict legal theory is supposed to dictate that A shall retain an unqualified
power of revocation even after B has entered upon performance of the
act. The conclusion thus deduced is so stupidly harsh that few com-
mentators have been inclined to defend it.2"-
The cure prescribed by the Contracts Restatement for this hitch in
legal theory is a radical one, which imports into the notion of revocability
no unaccustomed nuances. According to Section 45, so soon as B has
begun the requested act,200 A becomes bound to the full extent of the
205. "It seems diffieilt on theory successfully to question the [necessarily unquali-
fied?] power of one who offers to enter into a unilateral contract to withdraw his offer
at any time until performance has been completed by the offeree, but great injustice
may arise if the offeror's power of revocation continues so long." WrLrsTro, Con-
TRAc-s (2d. ed. 1936) § 60.
206. The language of § 45 makes A's promise binding on him so soon as "part of
the consideration requested . . . is given or tendered." The word "given" is, however,
apparently not intended in any sense of physical transfer; "to give part of the con-
sideration" seems merely to mean, "to begin the requested act."
[Vrol, 46: 373
-1936 RELIANCE INTEREST IN CONTRACT DAMAGES 411
expectancy, just as if the contract were bilateril. A's promise is no
longer an "offer," but has become a "contract," with all the consequences
(including irrevocability) thereto attaching.
In some situations, this solution of the problem may not be unjust.
But where the promisee's reliance before revocation was not extensive,
and is readily convertible into money, this treatment of the case will seem
unduly drastic when it is recalled that the obligation imposed is unilateral,
and that the promisor had no means of compelling the promisee to
complete the act if he .had chosen to abandon it. In such a case an
obvious compromise of the interests involved suggests imposing on the
revoking promisor a liability to reimburse the promisee's reliance. If
this view were adopted, A's promise would remain "revocable" even
after B had acted on it, in the sense that A might, by timely revocation,
relieve himself from liability for the expectation interest; it would, on
the other hand, have become "irrevocable" in the sense that A would,
despite his attempted revocation, remain liable to reimburse B's reliance.
Stated differently, A's revocation would operate simply to reduce the
scope of his possible liability to B.2 "T
The explanation for the failure of the Restatement to recognize this
middle course does not lie in an oversight, since Professor Williston
had previously considered this approach to the problem and had rejected
it-not because it was necessarily unwise or inexpedient, but apparently
becauge it was not "permissible," as lacking sufficient "warrant' in our
law.2 0  It is true that there are apparently no cases involving situations
207. The value of the gross e-xpectancy would properly be considered as limiting
B's claim to reimbursement for reliance. See the discussion pp. 7s-so, sitpra.
208. 1 "WmusroN, CoNThACTs (2d ed. 1936) §60AA. Professor Williston also
intimates that this'mode of treatment has been rendered superfluous by the more drastic
cure adopted in § 45 of the Co-TRACTs RESTATE:?mrE. This is true only on the assump-
tion that courts will be willing to adopt the cure there prescribed. (See p. 412 infra).
In the section cited, Professor WtVilliston associates what we have called "the middle
course' with Ihering's theory of culpa n contrahendo. By calling Ihering's view a "tort"
theory Professor Williston makes it seem very remote from anything in our law. Actually,
hering was most insistent that his suggested liability for the reliance interest be
classified as contractual. It is true that he rested the liability on the notion of "fault'
(culpa), but this was merely because the civil law treats the liability resulting from
breach of contract generally as founded on "fault." (If this notion of fault seems
Pickwickian to the common lawyer, let him consider the "fault" which we often
derive from the doctrine of res ipsa loqutlur.) Curiously enough, hering would not
have applied his theory to what we would call an offer for a unilateral contract where
the offer was made to a single individual. In the civil law, such an offer would become
a binding "contract" on "acceptance" by the promisee, i.e., on his simply stating that
he acceded to its terms. This notion of "accepting" a unilateral promise without either
doing an act or communicating a counter-promise seems strained to common law
lawyers, and has been criticized in Europe. Nevertheless, it was accepted by Thering,
and his analysis of the case where one individual promises a reward to another for
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dearly falling within Section 45 where the liability arising on revocation
has been measured by the reliance interest."'0 On the other hand, the
diversity in judicial treatment of the problem of Section 45-some cases
denying liability altogether, others imposing it on a variety of grounds210
-renders it questionable whether our law on this point warrants any
particular conclusion at all. Certainly it would be difficult to say that the
some act would, therefore, have been: (1) if the promisee "accepted" the promise,
a contract yielding the expectancy would result; (2) if the promisee began perform-
ance without first "accepting," he would be acting unreasdnably and would be entitled
to nothing in the event of revocation. Ihering, Culpa in contrahendo. (1860), printed
in 1 GisAmAftLTE AursATz (1881) 327, 364. Ihering's theory could apply to the
revocation of an offer for an act only in a situation where it would be unreasonable
to expect the offeree to accept the offer before beginning the act. The principal situ-
ation of this sort recognized by Thering was that of an offer to the public, and in the
case of such an offer (e. g., a prize contest) he proposed that the revoking offeror be
made liable to reimburse the reliance of those who had acted on the promise. This
suggestion was adopted in the Swiss Co or OBLIGATIONS § 8, but the GRMMAN CtVIL
.CoDE (§658) apparently provides that the offer becomes irrevocable (i.e., yields the
expectation interest) so soon as it has been relied on. (See, howe:er, Busca, DAS
BOREBLicHE GEsEzBucr § 658, n. 1, where the Section is interpreted to mean that
the offeror may withdraw his offer at any time before completion of the act-an inter-
pretation which seems to contradict directly the language of the section.) If its language
be accepted at face value, the effect of § 658 of the GERMAN CODE corresponds to § 45
of the RESTATEMENT, except that it is, for reasons already stated, confined to offers
made to the public.
209. Though, as Professor Williston himself states (CoNTRAcTs (2d ed. 1936)
§ 60AA, n. 4), G. Ober & Sons Co. v. Katzenstein, 160 N. C. 439, 76 S. E. 476 (1912)
comes close to being in point. In that case the plaintiff had taken the defendant's order
for a quantity of fertilizer and it was held that the exercise of an -expressly reserved
option to cancel the order imposed on the plaintiff a liability to reimburse the defendant
for "the damages he had sustained up to the time he had notice that the plaintiff
declined to fill his order, to wit, for the cost of preparing the plant bed, and for the
higher priced labor employed and held in readiness." (Id. at 442, 76 S. E. at 478.)
The situation involved in this case differs from that contemplated in § 45 only in the
fact that the reliance was here, in the terminology adopted earlier (see p. 78, suipra),
"incidental" rather than "essential" in nature. It is difficult to see why this should
make any difference in the treatment of the case.
210. See the cases discussed in 1 WILr.rSTON, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1936) §§ 60-60A.
In many of the cases imposing liability, a not particularly temerarious implication of
fact will suffice to make the contract bilateral; in a good many others (particularly
the real estate broker cases) it is arguable that the requested act had been completed
before revocation. Furthermore, in the real estate broker cases considerations of
administrative convenience -might, in any event, justify measuring damages by the
expectancy, i e., the pro.mised commission.
Cf. "The courts have reached results [in the case of offers for unilateral contracts]
which cannot be arrived at by applying the rule of Section 45. But they may be justi-
fied by considering the fair implication of each situation, custom included.' Whittier,
The Restatement of Contracts and Mutual Assent (1929) 17 CArIF. L. RY. 441, 451.
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cases compelled either the theory,2" or the result, adopted in Section 45.
One suspects that the middle course was excluded, not because specific
decisions stood in the way, but because it would haVe introduced com-
ple:ity into the notion of revocability, and perhaps also because, as in
the drafting of Section 90, it was assumed that no liability measured by
the promisee's reliance can be "contractual."
Outside the field covered by Section 45, a considerable number of cases
indicates that a liability limited to the reimbursement of reliance may
result from the timely revocation of a promise which, if it were left un-
revoked, might have imposed a liability fbr the expectation interest'
2
Even the repudiation of a bilateral contract may have this effect. Such
a repudiation destroys the plaintiff's power to continue performance at
the cost of the defendant; forfeits, in other words, his claim to the gross
expectation interest, and remits him to compensation for reliance and
the lost profit. If onoceasing performance, an opportunity to make a
similar profit elsewhere is open to him, he is bound to embrace this, and,
losing even his claim to the lost profit, is remitted entirely to the reliance
interest 21
3
211. The theory of §45 (see comment b) is that the promisor makes an implied
promise to keep his offer open pending performance, and that this promise becomes
binding through the offeree's reliance in beginning the requested act. So far as the
decisions are concerned, this theory finds support in only one or two judicial intima-
tions. (See 1 Wi Tw, CoNTcTs (2d ed. 1936) § 60A, n. 6.) The theory of the
implied promise not to revoke could, in any event, be made to yield the reliance interest
-in two different ways: (1) Since the promise not to revoke is "implied" (that is
to say, in this situation is a mere restatement of the justice of the case) it would be
just as easy to imply a promise not to revoke without making compensation as to
imply a promise absolute in terms. (Cf. the discussion of Duimas v. Li'bert, mipra,
at 401) ; (2) Even if the promise be considered unqualified in terms, it is a promise
made binding by unbargained-for reliance (since beginning the act can hardly be in-
tended as a bargained-for equivalent) and hence may, under decisions discussed mpra,
at 402 ff., be considered as imposing a liability for the reliance interest only. This
theory of the implied promise is, however, quite superfluous, since to escape it one
needs only to recognize that a single promise may impose one liability, if left unre-
voked, and a different liability, if timely notice of revocation is given. This analysis
makes it unnecessary to imagine into e.istence two promises in order to explain two
liabilities.
212. See, in addition to the cases discussed here, the previous reference to the
New York rule concerning attorney-client contracts, p. 393, sipra. Something rougbly
corresponding in effect to a qualified power of revocation might be recognized in actions
of deceit. Thus, in jurisdictions applying normally the loss-of-bargain measure of
recovery, it might be held that an early disclosure of the facts would operate to relieve
the party guilty of misrepresentation from any liability beyond that of reimbursing
reliance. In ines v. Erode, 168 Cal. 507, 143 Pac. 729 (1914), the principal reason
given for remitting the plaintiff to the reliance interest vas the fact that he had dis-
covered the fraud while the contract was still "in large part e-ecutory."
213. See p. 61, mepra. The rule of avoidable consequences would, no doubt, also be
applied to § 45, but with the difference that in the cases likely to arise under that
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A power of revocation qualified by what is approximately the duty
of reimbursing reliance is also recognized in cases like Offord v.
Davies.214 There 'the defendant promised to stand as surety during a
period of one year for all advances made to X. After the plaintiff
had, in reliance on this promise, advanced sums to X, the defendant
revoked his promise. Although the advances which had been made could
have been construed as furnishing a consideration to make the whole
promise binding, the court took a middle course and held that the
defendant retained the power of revocation, subject to a liability for
advances already made. Cases like Offord v. Davies are usually analysed
as involving "standing offers" to enter a series of "separate contracts,"
and are treated as involving nothing more than the proposition that an
unaccepted and unrelied-on offer may be revoked., Yet the promise of
the surety in Offord v. Davies was not an "offer" in the sense that it was
what the French call an avant-acte; it did not look forward to a further
exchange of intention between the parties."' 5 It was an "offer" only in the
sense that the court held it to be a revocable promise. So far as the conten-
tion that the promise "contemplated" a "series of contracts," rather than
"one contract," is concerned, this may be a good way of describing the
effect of the decision, but certainly it cannot be pretended that laymen
really contemplate in terms like these.21 Actually, any distinction between
cases like Offord v. Davies and cases coming within Section 45 (the
"offer" for a "single unilateral contract") lies not in any difference in
the intention of the parties, but in the relative ease with which, in the
former class of cases, the promisee's reliance may be cut into separately
compensable units. This being so, why should not the principle of
Offord v. Davies be extended to the case of the "single contract" where
part performance of the act can be readily compensated in money?
A clear illustration of a liability limited to the reliance interest arising
on the revocation of a promise is to be found in cases involving con-
section there will seldom be a chance for the plaintiff to "mitigate" the claim to the
lost profit (this would hardly be possible in the real estate broker or reward cases,
for example), so thAt in practice the plaintiff would be less frequently remitted to the
reliance interest under § 45 than in the case of the ordinary bilateral contract..
214. 12 C. B. N. S. 748 (1862); see I WILLISTON, CONTRACrs (2d ed. 1936) § 58.
Though the liability of the revoking promisor- in Offord v. Davies cannot be said to
be limited to the reliance interest (since he would be bound to pay at the contract rate
for acts of performance before his revocation), it does not include the profit lost on
prevented future acts of performance, compensation for which is apparently compelled
by § 45 of the RESTATEMENT in the cases coming under that section.
215. The word "offer" appears neither in the opinion of the court nor in the
argument of counsel.
216. Section 44 of the RESTATEMENT provides in effect that the decision in Offord
v. Davies will be followed wherever the case involves a "revocable offer contemplating
a serie of independent contracts by separate acceptances."
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tracts made expressly terminable at the vill of the revoking party,"
and in cases involving contracts of indefinite duration.1 8 In these .cases,
217. Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mutual Tire Stores, 161 S. C. 487, 159
S. E. 825 (1931), discussed and approved in (1932) 17 Comi. I. Q. 479, criticized in
(1931) 45 HARv. L. REv. 373; Watkins Co. v. Rich, 254 Mih. 82, 235 N. AM 345
(1931) ; Texas Co. v. Northup, 154 Va. 478, 153 S. E. 659 (1930). See also G. Ober
& Sons Co. v. Katzenstein, 160 N. C. 439, 76 S. F- 476 (1912), discussed note 209,
supra. In all of these cases the exercise of a power to terminate the contract was
held to create what was in effect a liability to reimburse reliance. (In the Philadelphia
Storage Battery Co. case the exact scope of the recovery was not defined, but the
implications of the majority opinion seem to confine it to the reliance interest.) With
the possible exception of the Northup case, in all of the cases cited the "contract"
involved might have been classified technically as a mere "offer" because of the re-
served power of cancellation. Though in the first three cases there was talk in the
opinions of "fraud," it seems a reasonable inference that the only "fraud" consisted in
revoking a promise after it had been relied on. In the Katscistchn case nothing %was
said about fraud. These cases indicate how inadequate is the usual analysis of the
problem of "mutuglity" (does the fact that a promise is "illusory" prevent "a contract"
from arising?), and suggest the necessity for a re-examination of the problem in terms
of the various contract interests. In the classification of cases, a disregard of the role
which these interests play in the judicial process leads to a placing of decisions in false
opposition to one another. Thus in (1931) 45 I-Rv. L. Rnv. 373, Philadelphia Storage
Battery Co. v. M1utual Tire Stores, mtpra, which allowed a claim for the reliance interest
against the terminating party, is stated to be "inconsistent" with Randall v, Michelin
Tire Co., 137 Misc. 570, 244 N. Y. Supp. 44 (1930), which denied a claim to the lost
profit.
Confirming the general tendency of the cases cited, though not involving the problem
of revocation, are those cases where courts have held that even an express stipulation
against legal liability does not necessarily protect an employer against a suit by his
employee where the employer's promise of a bonus or other benefit (such as "free'
insurance) has induced the employee to forego other employment and remain on the
job. See Comment (1936) 34 MIcH. L. REy. 700; (1936) 36 Cor.. I. RE. 996; (1935)
49 HARV. I. REv. 148. These cases also confirm the inference that the relied-on bilateral
contract may receive a radically different judicial treatment than would have been
accorded the executory agreement. As in cases like Hainsr v. Sidway, discussed
p. 397, sipra, the fact that recovery is here measured by the expectation interest (a
share in the promised bonus, for example) is explained simply by the fact that it would
be impossible in any other way to measure the promisee's reliance in money terms; to
give the expectancy here is the most natural and effective way of repairing the loss
through reliance.
218. Courier-journal Co. v. Miller, 20 Ky. L Rep. 1811, 50 S. V. 46 (1S99);
Garlock v. Motz Tire & Rubber Co., 192 Mich. 665, 159 N. IV. 344 (1916); see
Meyer v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 156 Mo. App. 170, 177, 136 S. V. 5, 7 (1911); cf.
REsTATL-',mET, Ar.Excy (1933) §§ 452-454. (It is not clear in these cases, or in the
first four cited in the last section, that the recovery e'tends to the entirc reliance interest.
The Garlock case, supra, limited the recovery to the loss involved in selling a stock of
goods which the defendant had required the plaintiff to keep on hand. The peculiarity
of these cases lies in the fact that the expectation interest here (being non-existent, or,
at least, indefinable) cannot serve its usual function in limiting recovery for reliance.
In such cases, one may expect courts to develop other means of restricting the scope
of recovery for losses through reliance. See note 56, supra.)
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courts have not hesitated to impose, as the price of terminating the con-
tract, bL liability to reimburse the other party's reliance, if hardship would
otherwise result from the termination.
Just as no single measure of damages is wise or even possible for all
contracts, so the legal effect of a revocation cannot be defined in the
same way for all situations. Assuming that the unrevoked promise will,
when certain conditions are fulfilled, subject the promisor to L liability
for the expectation interest, a revocation before those conditions have
occurred may be given four different effects. The revocation may be
held (a) to have no effect on the promisor's obligation other than that
which results from the promisee's "duty to mitigate damages," or, it
may be held effective to reduce the promisor's obligation to (b) a duty
to reimburse reliance, or- to (c) a duty to make restitution, or, it may
(d) be regarded as relieving the promisor from liability altogether.
Choice between these alternatives will be dictated in part by factors
already discussed in other connections, including considerations of ad-
ministrative convenience. There are, however, two considerations pe-
culiar to the problem of the promisee's claim to the reliance interest in
cases of revocation which deser-e brief mention here.
In the first place, if the promisee could, by "accepting" the promise,
have destroyed (better express6d, have reduced to minimum effect) the
promisor's power of revocation, then it may be unreasonable for him
to rely on the promise (which is here legally an "offer") before he has
.accepted it. His course of action is to accept, then rely. For this reason
one would not ordinarily expect a court to impose any liability on the
offeror who revoked an offer for a bilateral contract before it had been
accepted. In this light, even an offer for a bilateral contract which is
stated to remain open for a definite period may present a weaker case
for imposing a liability on the revoking offeror than do the cases coming
.under Section 45, since in the cases involving a promise for an act there
is nothing the promisee can do to bind the promisor except to perform
the requested act as rapidly as possible. Where a contract is concluded
- by correspondence, the need for protecting the offeree's reliance- will
depend in part on the rules concerning the time when acceptance takes
effect. If, as in the civil law generblly, a posted acceptance takes effect
only on receipt,.then there may be an interval of time before a revocation
can be received during which the offeree may need legal protection in his
reliance.210 In our law, since the posted acceptance normally takes effect
on dispatch, a similar need does not exist.
219. Ihering considered that one of the situations most urgently demanding for its
cure his theory of culpa in contrahendo was that of the offeree who dispatched his
acceptance by post and thereafter changed his position before receiving a revocation
which became effective before his acceptance arrived. Op. cit. supra note 208, at 402.
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In the second place, where a promise is expressly made revocable, or
is understood as a matter of business practice to be revocable, the ex-
pectancy created by it may be regarded as too insecure to make reason-
able the promisee's reliance.on it. There is always the chance that a
court will say that the man who acts in reliance on a revocable promise
does so at his own risk. The cases indicate, however, that the courts
will not be deterred by this argument from interfering on behalf of the
promisee in cases of hardship and oppression.
THE ComPENsALITY OF GAINS PREVENTED THROUGH -RELIANCE
Except in one or two instances, we have not called attention in this
instalment to the question whether gains prevented in reliance on a
promise would be compensated in those cases where a recovery founded
on the expectation interest would be denied. This was simply because
in most of the cases discussed the problem of recovery for this kind of
injury was not presented. Though, as we have already pointed out, 0
the reliance interest may be conceived to embrace, in some cases, profits
lost as well as disbursements, it should be recalled that it is in the field
of gains prevented that the reliance and expectation interests tend to
lose their separate identities."' In many of the cases discussed, it is
obvious that to broaden the recovery for the reliance interest to include
compensation for all the gains prevented in entering the contract would
be to defeat whatever policy may have dictated an exclusion of the
expectation interest from legal protection. This would be true, for ex-
ample, of contracts falling within the Statute of Frauds. On the other
hand, it is not clear that in all cases a denial of the expectation interest
would carry automatically the conclusion that gains prevented through
reliance on the promise might not be recovered. In some cases, a dis-
tinction would perhaps be taken between the loss of specific opportunities
for profit, and gains prevented which were claimed merely as "general
damages." For example, if some consideration of policy were conceived
to exclude from compensation "the lost profit" on a contract to marry,
The curious result is, then, that the need for imposing on the revoling offeror a liability
to reimburse reliance which was perhaps most acute in the modem Roman law is
obviated with us by the rule that acceptance takes effect on dispatch; while, on the
other hand, the case where with us the need is most pressing (the offer for a unilateral
contract) is taken care of in the civil law by the rule that the "acceptance!' of such
an offer operates to make it binding. See note 20S, mipra.
The interrelation e.dsting between the problem of the revocability of an offer and
that of the time when a posted acceptance takes effect is brought out in Nusbaunm,
Comparative Aspects of the Anglo-Anwrica;j Offer-and-Acceptance Doctrince (1936)
36 Co. L. REv. 920, where also appears (923-924) a summary of the law in civil
law countries concerning the revocation of offers.
220. See p. 55, mtpra.
221. Seep. 74, m0Pra.
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the same consideration would, no doubt, affect also a claim for a gener-
alized and undefined loss of other opportunities to marry, but it would
not necessarily carry over to a claim for the loss involved in turning
down a specific proposal of marriage. The field where this distinction
could present an issue is, however, greatly reduced by the circumstance
that in the only situation where general damages for gain prevented
through reliance would normally be inferable or capable of satisfactory
proof (i.e., where the subject matter of the contract is available on an
open market) the inclination to deny protection to the expectation in-
terest is at a minimum. 22 In practice, the problem of recovery for
gains prevented through reliance will naturally arise, therefore, chiefly
in claims for "special damages," except in those situations where it is
the form rather than the subject matter of the contract which precludes
recovery of the expectation interest-as in contracts within the Statute
of Frauds.
Even if it were assumed that an exclusion of the expectation interest
from legal protection carried with it a similar exclusion of all gains
prevented through reliance, whether "special" or "general" in nature,
there would still remain the difficulty of distinguishing between "losses
caused" and "gains prevented." No hard and fast line of division is
here possible. Even the loss of property is, in a sense, a gain prevented,
since property, in one aspect, is merely a protected expectancy. The
giving up of an employment legally terminable at will would probably
appear to most persons as th6 loss of a value once possessed, yet how
shall we define the distinction between such a "loss" and that caused
when one foregoes an opportunity to make a favorable purchase of
wheat on the open market? The one case looks like a bird in the hand
that was taken away; the other, like a bird in the bush that was never
caught. Yet in both the bird involved was merely an expectancy.223
THE CONSEQUENCES OF A WIDER RECOGNITION OF TEE
RELIANCE INTEREST
The cases discussed in this instalment show, we believe, that the
contractual reliance interest receives a much wider (though often covert)
recognition in the decisions than it does in the textbooks. There can be
little question that this judicial .recognition would be much enlarged if
the textbooks were to abandon their present treatment of contract claims
("all or nothing") in favor of an analysis in terms of distinct contract
interests such as is proposed here. This makes it necessary to consider
whether a wider recognition of the reliance interest would be desirable.
222. See p. 62, supra.
223. Cf. the section headed "Futere Deals, Properly and the Spot Market" in
Llewellyn, What Price Contract? (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 704, 727.
. (Vol. 46: 373
1936] RELIANCE INTEREST IN CONTRACT DAMAGES 419
Naturally, a proposal to abandon the theory that there is only one
kind of contract claim is likely to engender certain fears. The first of
these would be that a too cordial reception into contract law of what
Gardner has called "the tort principle!" 4 would blur the lines of division
separating the different branches of the law. Ve have already suffi-
ciently intimated our opinion that the breaking down of these depart-
mental barriers would represent a distinct service to legal thinking. If
these ancient boundaries were erased, it would become possible to analyse
the general problem of the legal sanction to be given expectancies cre-
ated by words or conduct in terms of the policies involved, and it would
be perceived that these policies cut across distinctions in the "nature"
of the obligation. This would in turn promote a desideratum already
recognized, s-- that the obvious (though generally unexamined) inter-
relations of contract, deceit, estoppel, and warranty be brought into
some coherent pattern. Even, however, if one wishes to preserve intact
the familiar landmarks, is there any reason why a liability to reimburse
reliance on a promise should be regarded as anything but "contractual"?
If one means by "contractual" a liability imposed because a promise
was made and broken, then a liability to compensate losses incurred on
the faith of a promise is as "contractual" as any other.
A second fear might be that the adoption of the analysis here proposed
would threaten legal certainty. The assumption is very commonly made
that legal certainty is necessarily promoted by limiting the alternative
courses of action open to judges. Though the all-or-nothing approach
may be harsh, it at least allows a man to know where he stands. This
comforting supposition can be preserved only so long as one ignores the
psychological realities of the judicial process. In fact, more often than
not, the all-or-nothing theory introduces stresses (and with them, a
fortuitous element) into the process of decision which can be.eliminated
only by the adoption of a more flexible scheme of legal sanctions.2
224. Gardner, An Inquiry into the Principles of the Law of Contracts (1932) 46
HRJlv. L. Rnv. 1, 22. Gardner recognizes, of course, that this "tort principle' is an
integral part of the present law of contracts..
225. Williston, LiabiliLy for Honest Misrepresentation (1911) 24 HRav. L. REv.
415; W"igmore, The Scientific Role of Consideration in Contract, LGAL ESSAYS nr
TnRnuTE To Omur Kip Mc MumAy (1935) 641. Williston seems to assume that the
policies affecting liability for the use of words are always the same; WVigmore, bn the
other hand, seems to assume that distinctions in these policies coincide with the present
lines of division in terms of the form of the remedy. It is difficult to agree with
either of these views. In a criticism of Williston's view, Whittier writes, "That
[two] obligations arise from the use of words is no more conclusive for uniformity
in the bases of the obligation than if both obligations arose out of the use of gasoline
engines, one in a mill, the other on the highwvay." Whittier, The Reslatenrat of
Contracts and Mifutual Assent (1929) 17 Cn.rr L. Ra,. 441, 442, n. 5.
226. Cf. Fuller, American Legal Realism (1934) 82 U. oF PA. L. REv. 429, 431
ets-eq.
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Still another fear might be that a wider recognition of the reliance
interest would unduly broaden the field of legal intervention. This was
the danger that Kohler had in mind when he wrote, in criticism of
Ihering's theory of culpa in contrahendo, "Not dvery fruitlessly paid
coach or street car fare demands legal redress."' 2  That the principle
of compensating losses incurred in reliance on promises cannot be given
an indefinite field of application must be admitted. Inconvenience suf-
fered when another changes his course of conduct is a constant feature
of life in society, and no judicial system would be equal to the task
of carrying out the literal implications of the maxim, neemo potest imetare
consilium suum in alteris iniurium. Nor is it an entirely adequate
answer to this objedtion to point out that people generally have sense
enough pot to bring suit for fruitlessly paid street car fares. Some
serious reliance incurred even in reasonable reliance on some promises
must probably go unredressed-at least, unless the word "reasonable"
be made to forfeit its ordinary meaning. Yet certainly this problem of
inclusion and exclusion permits of a more rational answer (or set of
answers) than to say, as Section 90 of the Restatement, for example,
asks us to say: "Either your losses must have been so great as to justify
us in enforcing the whole promise, or you go without remedy."
The objection just stated-viewed, as it were, from its reverse side
-reveals what is the most pressing need for a wider recognition of the
reliance interest, a need which extends through all the cases discussed
in this instalment. The objection to the all-or-nothing attitude is not
simply that it often results in the plaintiff's getting all when a part would
have made him whole. The more serious objection is that in those cases
where a court balks at giving him all, he may get nothing when he
urgently needed and deserved a part.228 This need makes it obvious that
we cannot solve the problem of reimbursing reliance simply by convert-
ing the relied-on promise into a' "contract" like every other contract,
The need for compensating reliance must be treated as a distinct promis-
sory interest, deserving recognition on itsown account.
227. Ueber den Willen im Privagrecht (1889) 28 IHERINGS JA 'hjOCUER 166, 229.
See also Cohen, The Basis of Contract (1933) 46 HIAv. L. Rav. 553, 579.
228. In Phillipsburgh Bank v. Fulmer, 31 N. J. Law 52 (Sup. Ct. 1864), the plaintiff,
in reliance on a representation by the defendant that he owed $2000 to the plaintiff's
debtor, had commenced a proceeding to have this debt applied to his claim. The
defendant then pleaded that he in fact owed nothing to the plaintiff's debtor. The
court said, "If the estoppel could be so used as merely to charge the defendant with
costs . . . that would be a legitimate use of it; but so to apply it as to charge. the
defendant with the payment of a large sum of money he does not owe . . . Is to
make it the means of working, and not of preventing, a serious injury." (Id. at 56.)
Should not the court's doubt be resolved in favor of saying, "It can be so used"?
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